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Stock Market Manipulation and Corporate
Control Transactions*
NORMAN S. POSER**
The definition of manipulation has recently become a live issue in
the context of mergers, tender offers, and going private transactions
In responding to allegations of manipulative management tactics,
courts have sometimes stretched the concept of manipulation in
order to find a violation of section 14(e) or section 10(b) of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. In the recent case of Schrei-
ber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., the Supreme Court held that
there can be no manipulation without misrepresentation or nondis-
closure. The author shows that this is consistent with the
antimanipulative provisions of the Exchange Act. He also explores
the nature of the deception and the intent that is needed to prove
manipulation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
It may seem surprising that, more than fifty years after the incep-
tion of federal securities regulation, the meaning of so basic a concept
as manipulation should require clarification. The eradication of
manipulation was, after all, one of the main purposes of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"), and Congress designed
several of its provisions to accomplish this result.2 Yet the Act
nowhere defines the term "manipulation" or "manipulative."
For many years, the absence of a definition did not seem to create
major interpretive problems.3 By and large, courts, regulators, and
commentators agreed on what was meant by manipulation.4 In recent
years, however, the question of the meaning and scope of manipula-
tion has become a subject of sharp controversy. The issue has usually
arisen in the context of mergers;5 tender offers;6 going private transac-
tions;7 and, more generally, other situations involving possible shifts
in or reinforcement of corporate control.' Transactions of these kinds
1. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Exchange Act]; see Exchange Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b.
2. See Exchange Act § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 78i; Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b);
Exchange Act § 13(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e); Exchange Act § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e);
Exchange Act § 15(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(1); Exchange Act § 15(c)(2), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o(c)(2).
3. It does not appear that a single article dealing with stock market manipulation
appeared in any major law review between 1952 and 1981.
4. According to a 1934 study, manipulation means "planned effort by an individual or
group of individuals to make the market price of a security behave in some manner in which it
would not behave if left to adjust itself to uncontrolled or uninspired supply and demand."
TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, THE SECURITY MARKETS 444 (A. Bernheim & M. Schneider
eds. 1935) [hereinafter cited as TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND].
5. See, e.g., Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975).
6. See, e.g., Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970). For a definition of the term "tender offer," see infra note 174.
7. See, e.g., Shivers v. Amerco, 670 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1982). A "going private"
transaction is typically one in which controlling persons of a publicly owned company convert
the company into a privately owned one. See SEC Rule 13e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1985).
8. See, e.g., Nash v. Farmers New World Life Ins. Co., 570 F.2d 558 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 822 (1978) (claim by minority shareholders that the acquisition of 95% of the
outstanding shares by a controlling shareholder by means of a tender offer was manipulative
because it "destroyed the market" for the corporation's shares).
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are referred to collectively in this Article as "corporate control
transactions."
In several recently decided cases, a shareholder of a company
that was the target of a hostile tender offer,9 or the tender offeror
itself,' ° has challenged the defensive tactics used by the target com-
pany's management, claiming that these tactics constitute manipula-
tive activities prohibited by section 10(b) or 14(e). The question
raised in several of these cases has been: whether fully and accurately
disclosed actions can constitute manipulation? Or, put another way:
is deception an essential element of manipulation?
Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc.,"I decided by the Supreme
Court of the United States near the end of its 1984 Term, provides an
answer to this question. In Schreiber, the Court held that "manipula-
tive" conduct under section 14(e) 12 of the Exchange Act 13 necessarily
includes a misrepresentation or nondisclosure. The decision makes
clear that if the management of a target company fully and accurately
discloses its actions to deter or defeat a hostile tender offer, then its
actions are not illegal under section 14(e). 14 Furthermore, the Court
held that it is not within the province of the federal courts to rule on
the fairness of the actions of participants in tender offers. So long as
these activities are disclosed, it is for the market to determine whether
a tender offer will be successful, subject to applicable requirements of
9. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1092 (1981).
10. See, e.g., Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).
11. 105 S. Ct. 2458 (1985).
12. Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e).
13. Id.
14. Section 14(e) forbids not only "manipulative," but also "fraudulent" or "deceptive"
acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer; in Schreiber, the Supreme Court held
that all three words connote deception. "All three species of misconduct ... are directed at
failures to disclose." Schreiber, 105 S. Ct. at 2462. See infra text accompanying notes 64-70.
The Schreiber case itself did not involve management's defensive tactics against a hostile
tender offer, but rather allegedly collusive arrangements between a tender offeror and
management of a target company, to the detriment of the target's shareholders. See infra text
accompanying notes 41-46. The full text of section 14(e) is as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a material
fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading,
or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in
connection with any tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any
solicitation of security holders in opposition to or in favor of any such offer,
request, or invitation. The Commission shall, for the purposes of this subsection,
by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to
prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e).
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state corporate law. ' 5
Schreiber thus has an important potential impact on contested
tender offers. The decision, however, has even broader implications.
In Schreiber, the Court took the occasion to reaffirm its earlier state-
ments in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder 16 and Santa Fe Industries, Inc.
v. Green 17 that the term "manipulative" as used in section 10(b)'8 of
the Exchange Act, which, as implemented by Securities Exchange
Commission Rule lOb-5 ("Rule lOb-5"),' 9 outlaws manipulative con-
duct in connection with any purchase or sale of a security,2" should
likewise be interpreted to require misrepresentation or other deceptive
conduct.2
Nonetheless, Schreiber deals with only one aspect of manipula-
tion-the requirement that there be deception. Even there, the deci-
sion does not concern itself with the nature of the requisite deception.
Furthermore, the Schreiber Court did not deal with the question of
the intent or purpose that is necessary to prove a case of manipula-
tion, let alone provide a comprehensive definition of the term "manip-
ulative." These are matters that this Article will address.
This Article does not, however, purport to be a general article on
15. Schreiber, 105 S. Ct. at 2444. On the question of the application of state corporate law
in tender offer situations, see infra text accompanying notes 24-26 and note 77.
16. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
17. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
18. Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
19. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1985).
20. The full text of section 10(b) is as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails, or of any facility of
any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention
of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). The full text of Rule lOb-5 is as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of
any national securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a mate-
rial fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the cir-
cumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1985).
21. Schreiber, 105 S. Ct. at 2462.
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the subject of stock market manipulation. That subject is comprehen-
sively covered by Professor Loss in his incomparable treatise,22 and in
addition there are several law review articles which, although now
quite old, provide excellent discussions of the antimanipulative provi-
sions of the Exchange Act.23 The purpose of this Article is rather to
study the application of the antimanipulative provisions of the
Exchange Act to corporate control transactions, in order to under-
stand the concept of manipulation in this important modem context.
To do this, however, it is necessary not only to revisit briefly the legis-
lative history of the Exchange Act and its more recent annex, the
Williams Act, but also to look at what the term "manipulation"
meant before 1934.
One of the premises of this Article is that the concept of manipu-
lation derives not only from the common law but also from practices
that were common in the securities markets of the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, and that the undefined word "manipula-
tive" that appears in sections 10(b) and 14(e) of the Exchange Act is
informed by these practices. Only against the background of actual
conduct in the pre-1934 securities markets can one properly under-
stand the antimanipulative provisions of the Exchange Act. It is clear
from this background that a corporate control transaction is manipu-
lative if deception is used as an integral part of a scheme, one of whose
objects is to affect the market price of a security. If the elements of
deception and manipulative intent are present, the fact that the ulti-
mate goal of the scheme is to achieve or maintain corporate control
does not prevent the transaction from being manipulative.
Immediately following this introduction, Part II will examine
Schreiber and its background. Part III will explore the meaning of
"manipulation" under the common law and, more broadly, as the
financial community prior to 1934 understood the term. Part IV will
discuss the antimanipulative provisions of the Exchange Act and their
legislative history. Finally, Part V presents an analyisis of the issues
of deception and intent in light of recent federal court decisions in
corporate control situations.
II. THE SCHREIBER DECISION AND ITS BACKGROUND
To a large degree, the use of the antimanipulative provisions of
22. 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1529-70 (2d ed. 1961).
23. See Berle, Stock Market Manipulation, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 393 (1938); Note,
Manipulation of the Stock Markets Under the Securities Laws, 99 U. PA. L. REV. 651 (1951);
Note, Regulation of Stock Market Manipulation, 56 YALE L.J. 509 (1947); Comment, Market
Manipulation and the Securities Exchange Act, 46 YALE L.J. 624 (1937).
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the federal securities laws as a basis for challenging management's
defensive tactics is a direct result of the inadequacy of state corporate
law, as interpreted by the courts, to protect the interests of sharehold-
ers. 4 In several cases involving a contest for corporate control, the
principal thrust of the plaintiff's claim has been that actions by mem-
bers of management were designed to further their own interests, for
the purpose of retaining control of the corporation, or of benefiting
themselves in other ways, in violation of their fiduciary duty to the
corporation and its shareholders. 25  Traditionally such charges are
within the province of state law. Plaintiffs in these cases, however,
have not generally fared well. The judicially created "business judg-
ment rule," which holds that a court will not review actions of direc-
tors on behalf of the corporation if these actions can be supported by a
rational business purpose, has often foreclosed relief under state cor-
porate law. To overcome the business judgment rule, the person chal-
lenging the transaction has the burden of proving that the directors
acted solely or primarily for the purpose of retaining control.26
Faced with the difficulty of successfully challenging directors'
actions under state law, plaintiffs in situations of this kind have turned
to the federal securities laws. If the target company, however, has
complied with the disclosure and substantive requirements of the Wil-
liams Act (the sections of the Exchange Act, adopted in 1968 and
amended in 1970, which regulate tender offers, corporate repurchases,
and certain related matters) 27 and has not engaged in any other decep-
tive conduct, then the only provisions of federal law that might be the
basis for a lawsuit are the prohibitions against stock price manipula-
tion contained in sections 9(a), 10(b), and 14(e) of the Exchange
24. For a general critique of the corporate law of Delaware, see Cary, Federalism and
Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974).
25. In Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., a divided panel of the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals held that under the law of Illinois, plaintiffs, who were shareholders of Marshall Field
& Co., failed to provide the evidence of self-dealing, fraud, overreaching, or other bad conduct
necessary to show a breach of the directors' fiduciary duties when they employed defensive
tactics to fend off possible takeovers. 686 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092
(1981). The majority relied heavily on the "business judgment rule" and attached particular
significance to the fact that Marshall Field had a majority of independent directors. Id. at 295-
99. See infra text accompanying note 26; see also Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493
A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
26. See Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1984); Panter v.
Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Johnson v.
Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981); Treadway Cos. v. Care
Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del.
1985).
27. Exchange Act § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d); Exchange Act § 13(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e);
Exchange Act § 14(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d); Exchange Act § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e);




Charging management of a company that is defending itself from
a hostile tender offer with manipulation is a plausible litigation strat-
egy. Because manipulation is usually considered to involve an "artifi-
cial" influence on the market price of a stock,2 9 any action which may
affect the outcome of a tender offer might conceivably be manipula-
tive, as it is likely to have an impact on the price of the target com-
pany's stock.30 Indeed, the crucial importance of the market price of
the target company's stock in a contested tender offer creates a strong
inducement to employ manipulative acts.3
In 1981, in Mobil Corp v. Marathon Oil Co.,32 the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that a target company's defensive tactic against
a takeover was a "manipulative act or practice," in violation of sec-
tion 14(e), although the action taken was fully disclosed and did not
contain any element of deception. A company whose shares were the
subject of a tender offer had given options to a third company to
purchase the target company's most valuable asset and newly issued
shares of the target. The options were exercisable in the event of a
change of control of the target not approved by its management. The
court held that these "lock-up options," though fully disclosed and
nondeceptive, were manipulative because they "artificially and signifi-
cantly discouraged competitive bidding" for the target company's
stock.33
Mobil touched off a spirited controversy in the law reviews on the
28. See infra text accompanying notes 177-241, 245-46, 256-66.
29. "So long as the investor's motive.., is not to create an artificial demand for, or supply
of, the security, illegal market manipulation is not established." Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v.
Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 383 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973), reh'g
denied, 430 U.S. 976 (1976).
30. Manipulation in connection with contests for corporate control is not new. For a
description of how in 1881 entrepreneur Jay Gould employed a variety of manipulative devices
to drive down the price of the stock of the Manhattan Elevated Railway Company in order to
acquire control of the company at a reduced price, see M. JOSEPHSON, THE ROBBER BARONS
209-12 (1934).
31. See, e.g., Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970) (Where the target company's management effected both heavy
open-market purchases and secret off-market sales on the last day of a tender offer to make the
market price of the stock equal or exceed the tender offer price and thus discourage
shareholders from tendering their shares, the Second Circuit held that these activities were
manipulative and deceptive, in violation of section 9(a)(2) of the Act.). For further discussion
of the case, see infra text accompanying notes 355-56.
32. 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).
33. Id. at 376. Cf Biechele v. Cedar Point, Inc., 747 F.2d 209, 213-14 (6th Cir. 1984)
(distinguishing Mobil's "lock-up options" from this case's "add-on agreement," under which a
buyer of stock would receive additional compensation from the seller under certain
circumstances, and holding the latter not to be a manipulative device).
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question of whether deception was an essential element of manipula-
tion under the federal securities laws.34 If it were not, then corporate
management's complex and ingenious methods to thwart the plans of
potential or actual raiders might be proscribed as manipulative, in
violation of section 14(e) and perhaps 10(b). Certainly the "shark
repellents,"35 "poison pills,"'36 and other devices that management has
used to deter or defeat takeover attempts are as artificially discourag-
ing to competitive bidding for corporate control as were the lock-up
options used in Mobil. No other circuit, however, has followed the
Sixth Circuit's broad view of manipulation as articulated in Mobil. In
addition the Second 37 and Eighth Circuits38 have flatly rejected the
Sixth Circuit's broad view of manipulation.39 On the other hand,
most law review writers who commented on Mobil defended the deci-
sion, generally on the ground that prohibiting defensive tactics that as
a practical matter reduced the choices available to shareholders of a
34. See, e.g., Weiss, Defense Responses to Tender Offers and the Williams Act's Prohibition
Against Manipulation, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1087 (1982); Note, Target Defensive Tactics as
Manipulative Under Section 14(e), 84 COLUM. L. REV. 228 (1984); Note, Section 14(e) of the
Williams Act: Can There Be Manipulation with Full Disclosure or Was the Mobil Court
Running on Empty?, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 159 (1983); see also Junewicz, The Appropriate
Limits of Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1171 (1984);
Note, Protecting Shareholders Against Partial and Two-Tiered Takeovers: The "Poison Pill"
Preferred, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1964, 1978-83 (1984) [hereinafter Note, The "Poison Pill"
Preferred ].
35. The term "shark repellent" is typically used to refer to "amendments to a potential
subject company's certificate of incorporation or by-laws that have been devised to discourage
unsolicited approaches from unwanted bidders." See ADVISORY COMM. ON TENDER
OFFERS, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM'N REPORT OF RECOMMENDATIONS 141 (1983).
Under this category fall tactics such as super majority provisions, fair price provisions, and
staggered boards. See generally M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS AND
FREEZEOUTS §§ 6.2-.3 (1978) (two volume, current coverage of the area, including examples
of relevant documents); Friedenberg, Jaws III: The Impropriety of Shark-Repellent
Amendments as a Takeover Defense, 7 DEL. J. CORP. L. 32 (1981) (describing the major types
of shark-repellent amendments surviving current legal approaches to the subject, and
analyzing advantages of the various provisions); Hochman & Folger, Deflecting Takeovers:
Charter and By-Law Techniques, 34 Bus. LAW 537 (1979) (discussing defensive provisions
within the frameworks of Delaware and New York law).
36. The term "poison pill" refers to an issue of securities that is convertible upon a
takeover into securities of the acquiring company, with the result that the acquirer's stock is
diluted. See Note, The "Poison Pill" Preferred, supra note 34; see also Moran v. Household
Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059 (Del. 1985) (where the Supreme Court of Delaware held that the
"poison pill" device was acceptable as an anticipatory defense to potential takeover attempts).
37. Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1052 (1984); Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Co., 717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1018 (1983).
38. Feldbaum v. Avon Prod., Inc., 741 F.2d 234 (8th Cir. 1984).
39. Even the Sixth Circuit has circumscribed its holding in Mobil-the court stated: "This
court cautioned that Mobil was an unusual case and that its holding was not to be broadened
and applied indiscriminately." Biechele v. Cedar Point, Inc., 747 F.2d 209 (6th Cir. 1984).
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target company who are confronted with a tender offer was consistent
with the overriding legislative purpose of the Williams Act: to give
such shareholders the opportunity to decide, in an unpressured
atmosphere, whether to tender their shares.4°
The Supreme Court of the United States has now resolved the
issue in favor of a narrow interpretation of the term "manipulation."
In Schreiber,4 a wholly owned subsidiary of Burlington Northern,
Inc. had made a tender offer in December 1982 for 25.1 million (or
fifty-one percent) of the outstanding shares of El Paso Gas Co., at a
price of $24 per share. Despite opposition from El Paso's manage-
ment, the offer was fully subscribed by its last day, December 30,
1982. The tender offer provided a number of conditions under which
Burlington could cancel the offer at any time before it actually paid
for the shares.4 2
On January 10, 1983, Burlington announced that it had made a
new, friendly takeover agreement with El Paso's management. Under
the new agreement, Burlington rescinded the December tender offer
and substituted a new offer under which it would buy not only
twenty-one million shares from El Paso shareholders at $24, but
would also buy 4,166,667 newly issued shares from El Paso at the
same price. In addition, Burlington agreed to provide "procedural
protections" for the remaining El Paso shareholders in the event of a
subsequent merger of the two companies,43 and that Burlington would
recognize existing "golden parachute" agreements between El Paso
and four members of its senior management, which gave these officers
long-term employment protection in the event that El Paso should be
taken over.44
The revised tender offer was substantially oversubscribed, more
than forty million shares being tendered by February 8, 1983. As a
result, El Paso shareholders who had tendered their shares in the first
40. The Supreme Court, in examining the legislative history of section 14(e), has
concluded that "the sole purpose of the Williams Act was the protection of investors who are
confronted with a tender offer." Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 35 (1977). Accord
Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975). For the argument that
"manipulation" under section 14(e) should be interpreted in accordance with the overriding
legislative purpose of the Williams Act, see for example, Weiss, supra note 34, at 1095-1100.
41. 105 S. Ct. 2458 (1985).
42. Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 197, 199 (D. Del. 1983), aff'd, 731 F.2d
163 (3d Cir. 1984), aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 2458 (1985). The complaint alleged that none of the
conditions for cancellation of the tender offer ever occurred. Joint Appendix at JA-11,
-Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 731 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1984), aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 2458 (1985)
(Second Amended Class Action Complaint, 20).
43. The procedural protections required approval by non-Burlington members of El Paso's
board of directors for a merger. Schreiber, 105 S. Ct. at 2460 n. 1.
44. Id. at 2460 n.2.
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offer and then had retendered them were able to sell fewer shares at
the favorable price of $24 because they were now part of a larger
prorationing pool.45
The plaintiff, who was one of these shareholders, brought an
action against the two companies and El Paso's board of directors, on
behalf of herself and other similarly situated shareholders. She
claimed that the withdrawal of the first tender offer and the substitu-
tion of the second offer were a "manipulative" distortion of the mar-
ket for El Paso shares, in violation of section 14(e).46
The district court dismissed the suit, on the ground that, because
the alleged manipulation did not involve a misrepresentation, it did
not violate section 14(e).47 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the lower court's decision. 41 In a unanimous opinion 49 by
Chief Justice Burger, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that "the
term 'manipulative' as used in § 14(e) requires misrepresentation or
nondisclosure. . . . Without misrepresentation or nondisclosure,
§ 14(e) has not been violated."50
In its opinion, the Court followed its now-familiar procedure5' of
first examining the language of the statute, then reviewing its purpose
and legislative history, and finally discussing questions of policy.52 As
to the statutory language, the Court stated that the plaintiff's reading
of the term "manipulative"-to include acts which, although fully
disclosed, "artificially" affect the price of the takeover target's stock-
conflicted with "the normal meaning of the term."53 In this connec-
45. Under the Williams Act and the rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
where an offeror makes a tender offer for fewer than all of the outstanding equity securities of a
class, and shareholders tender a greater number of shares than the tender offeror is bound to
purchase, the tender offeror must purchase a pro rata number of shares of each shareholder
who tenders his shares during the life of the tender offer. Exchange Act § 14(d)(6), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78(n)(6); SEC Rule 14d-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8 (1985).
46. Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e). See supra note 14. The plaintiff also alleged that
the defendants failed to disclose the "golden parachute" agreements when Burlington made
the January tender offer. She claimed that this nondisclosure was a deceptive act forbidden by
section 14(e). The court held that, because the only injuries claimed by the plaintiff were
related to the cancellation of the first offer, and because the alleged deception occurred in
relation to the making of the second offer, there was no causal relationship between the
deception and the plaintiff's alleged injuries. Schreiber, 105 S. Ct. at 2465.
47. Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 197, 204 (D. Del. 1983).
48. Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 731 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1984).
49. Justice Powell took no part in the decision, and Justice O'Connor took no part in the
consideration or the decision.
50. Schreiber, 105 S. Ct. at 2465.
51. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
52. "The [Court's] starting point is the language of the statute." Schreiber, 105 S. Ct.
2461.
53. Id. at 2461-62.
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tion, the Court's opinion quoted at some length from dicta in its opin-
ions in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder54 and Santa Fe Industries v.
Green 11 in which it had interpreted the term "manipulation" as the
term is used in section 10(b).16 Because these earlier statements of the
Supreme Court's views on manipulation have been the basis for
numerous court of appeals and district court decisions during the past
decade,57 and have now been found by the Court to be equally appli-
cable to section 14(e), they are worth setting forth here.
In Hochfelder, a 1976 decision, the Supreme Court held that sci-
enter, or "intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud,"5" is an essential
element of a private cause of action under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-
5. In reviewing the language of section 10(b), the Court stated: "Use
of the word 'manipulative' is especially significant. It is and was vir-
tually a term of art when used in connection with the securities mar-
kets. It connotes intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive or
defraud investors by controlling or artificially affecting the price of
securities." 59
A year later, in Santa Fe, the Court decided that a claim by
minority shareholders of unfair treatment by corporate management
in setting the compensation that they would receive in a Delaware
''squeeze-out" merger did not state a cause of action under section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5, in the absence of deceptive or manipulative
conduct.6 ° In discussing the "manipulative" language of section
10(b), the Court said:
The term refers to practices, such as wash sales, matched orders, or
rigged prices, that are intended to mislead investors by artificially
affecting the market activity .... Section 10(b)'s general prohibi-
tion of practices deemed by the SEC to be "manipulative"-in this
technical sense of artificially affecting market activity in order to
mislead investors-is fully consistent with the fundamental pur-
54. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
55. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
56. Schreiber, 105 S. Ct. at 2462.
57. See, e.g., Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 540 (9th Cir. 1984);
Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d 1, 4 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1052 (1984); Dan River v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278, 285 (4th Cir. 1983); Billard v. Rockwell
Int'l Corp., FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,733 (2d Cir. June 30, 1982); Panter v. Marshall
Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 287-89 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Radol v.
Thomas, 534 F. Supp. 1302, 1311 (S.D. Ohio 1982), aff'd, 722 F.2d 244 (6th Cir. 1985).
58. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193.
59. Id. at 199 (emphasis subsequently added in Schreiber, 105 S. Ct. at 2462).
60. 430 U.S. at 474-77. "A 'squeeze-out' merger occurs when Corporation A, which holds
a controlling interest in Corporation B, uses its control to merge B into itself or into a wholly
owned subsidiary. The minority shareholders in Corporation B are, in effect, forced to sell
their stock." Schreiber, 105 S. Ct. at 2460 n.l.
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pose of the 1934 Act " 'to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure
for the philosophy of caveat emptor. . . .' " . . . Indeed, nondisclo-
sure is usually essential to the success of a manipulative scheme....
No doubt Congress meant to prohibit the full range of ingenious
devices that might be used to manipulate securities prices. But we
do not think it would have chosen this "term of art" if it had
meant to bring within the scope of 10(b) instances of corporate
mismanagement such as this, in which the essence of the complaint
is that shareholders were treated unfairly by a fiduciary.6 '
Subsequent law review writers, arguing for a broader definition
of manipulation that would encompass nondeceptive acts, pointed out
that in Santa Fe (although not in Hochfelder) the Court carefully
qualified its narrow characterization of manipulation (that is, manipu-
lation generally refers to practices such as wash sales, etc. Nondisclo-
sure is usually essential to the success of a manipulative scheme).62 In
view of the fact, however, that the Santa Fe Court was not focusing
on the question of the meaning of manipulation, it is understandable
that the Court avoided making an unqualified statement as to its defi-
*nition. In Schreiber, the Court based its opinion that misrepresenta-
tion or nondisclosure is an essential element of manipulation under
section 14(e) on the views that it had expressed in Santa Fe with
regard to section 10(b). In doing so, the Court ignored the qualifying
language that it had used in Santa Fe, making it clear that misrepre-
sentation or nondisclosure is always required in order to make out a
case of manipulation.63
Furthermore, the Court refuted the plaintiff's textual argument,
one often made by law review writers as well, that "Congress' use of
the disjunctive in section 14(e), which bars 'fraudulent, deceptive, or
manipulative acts or practices,' also suggests that 'deceptive' acts and
'manipulative' acts are different kinds of behavior."'  The Court
countered this argument with the statement that "it is a familiar prin-
ciple of statutory construction that words grouped in a list should be
given related meaning. ' 6- In the Court's view, the presence of the
word "deceptive" in the statute reinforces rather than negates the idea
that manipulative conduct is itself deceptive conduct.66
61. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 476-77 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
62. See, e.g., Junewicz, supra note 34, at 1183; Weiss, supra note 34, at 1097; Note, Target
Defensive Tactics as Manipulative Under Section 14(e), supra note 34, at 246.
63. Schreiber, 105 S. Ct. at 2462-63.
64. Weiss, supra note 34, at 1097 (footnote omitted).
65. Schreiber, 105 S. Ct. at 2462 (citing Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 104
S. Ct. 3003, 3010 (1984)).
66. Id. at 2462-63. All of which demonstrates that Supreme Court Justices have the
privilege of selecting the applicable maxim of statutory construction.
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The Court also stated that the meaning that it had given to the
term "manipulation" in Hochfelder and Santa Fe was consistent with
the use of the term at common law, 6 ' and with its "traditional diction-
ary definition."' 6 Finally, the Court indicated that it saw little signifi-
cance in the differences between the wording of sections 10(b) and
14(e). 69 The former speaks of "any manipulative or deceptive device
or contrivance," while the latter prohibits "any fraudulent, deceptive,
or manipulative acts or practices." The Court pointed out that "[a]ll
three species of conduct, i.e., 'fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative,'
listed by Congress [in Section 14(e)] are directed at failures to dis-
close. The use of the term 'manipulative' provides emphasis and gui-
dance to those who must determine which types of acts are reached
by the statute .... 7
The Court then turned to the purpose and legislative history of
the Williams Act and of section 14(e). The Court's view of the Wil-
liams Act is illuminating, particularly in light of the somewhat differ-
ing statements as to the purpose of this legislation that the Court has
made in previous opinions. 71 First, the Court said that the purpose of
the Williams Act "was to preserve a neutral setting in which the con-
tenders [in a tender offer] could fully present their arguments."'72
Congress intended to ensure that shareholders who were confronted
with a tender offer would be provided with adequate information, and
67. See infra text accompanying notes 146-66.
68. Schreiber, 105 S. Ct. at 2462. The Court quoted this dictionary definition,
"manipulation is 'management with use of unfair, scheming, or underhanded methods.'" Id.
at n.5 (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1376 (1971)). It is not
clear how this definition supports the Court's conclusion that manipulation requires deception,
because the definition appears to encompass unfair, though fully disclosed, actions.
69. See infra text accompanying notes 257-66.
70. Schreiber, 105 S. Ct. at 2462.
71. Compare Piper Aircraft Co. v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 31 (1977) ("(T]he
legislation was designed solely to get needed information to the investor ....") with Edgar v.
MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 634 (1982) ("Congress sought to protect the investor not only by
furnishing him with the necessary information but also by withholding from management or
the bidder any undue advantage that could frustrate the exercise of an informed choice.")
(citation omitted). The latter statement has been used as the basis for making the argument
that section 14(e) imposes substantive requirements on participants in tender offers. See Data
Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 1538, 1545 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 722 F.2d
1 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052 (1984).
72. Schreiber, 105 S. Ct. at 2463. Previous Supreme Court decisions interpreting the
Williams Act also have emphasized the neutral stance of the act as between tender offeror and
management of the target company. "There is no question that in [adopting the Williams
Act], Congress intended to protect investors.... But it is also crystal clear that a major aspect
of the effort to protect the investor was to avoid favoring either management or the takeover
bidder." Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 633 (1982) (citations omitted). See also Piper
Aircraft Corp. v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1977) (discussing the Congressional
policy of evenhandedness).
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"relied primarily on disclosure to implement the purpose of the Wil-
liams Act."' 73 Section 14(e) was designed as a broad antifraud provi-
sion, supplementing the more specific disclosure requirements of the
statute.74 In perhaps the most significant sentence in its opinion, the
Court stated:
Nowhere in the legislative history is there the slightest suggestion
that § 14(e) serves any purpose other than disclosure, or that the
term 'manipulative' should be read as an invitation to the courts to
oversee the substantive fairness of tender offers; the quality of any
offer is a matter for the marketplace.75
Regulation of the fairness of tender offers thus is not a purpose of the
Williams Act, even though the concept of "fairness" may involve
more than simply the price of the offer (as it does in Schreiber), and
extend to dealings between the tender offeror and corporate manage-
ment that involve a breach of management's fiduciary duty to the
shareholders. The Court also apparently feared that a broad interpre-
tation of the term "manipulation" would inevitably involve it in "fair-
ness" questions.76
In the absence of deceptive acts, the antifraud provisions of the
Exchange Act, whether section 14(e) or 10(b), do not concern them-
selves with protecting investors against unfair treatment, breach of
fiduciary duty, or corporate mismanagement. These are matters that
73. Schreiber, 105 S. Ct. at 2463.
74. These requirements are contained in section 14(d), Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d).
75. Schreiber, 105 S. Ct. at 2464 (footnote omitted).
76. The Court's holding that the sole purpose of section 14(e) is disclosure raises a
question as to the validity of SEC Rules 14e-l, 14e-2, and 14e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1-3
(1985), which are substantive rules adopted by the Commission under section 14(e). See Pitt &
Cherno, Williams Act Rejected as Tool to Ensure Fairness, Legal Times, June 17, 1985, at 27,
col. 1. Rule 14e-I regulates the length of time that a tender offer must remain open; Rule 14e-
2 requires management of a target company to state its position with respect to whether it
recommends that shareholders accept or reject a tender offer; and Rule 14e-3 prohibits those
having material non-public information concerning a tender offer to trade or to "tip" other
persons.
The adoption of substantive rules under the section can, however, be defended on the
ground that the section gives the Commission authority to adopt rules not only to define
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts and practices, but also to "prescribe means
reasonably designed to prevent" such acts and practices. Exchange Act § 14(e), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(e). In Schreiber, the Court said that it disagreed with the plaintiff's argument that this
broad rulemaking authority would be pointless if section 14(e) were concerned with disclosure
only. By giving the Commission this authority (in the 1970 amendments to the Williams Act),
"Congress simply provided a mechanism for defining and guarding against those acts and
practices which involve material misrepresentation or nondisclosure . . . without suggesting
any change in the meaning of the term 'manipulative' itself." Schreiber, 105 S. Ct. at 2464,
n. 11. For a post-Schreiber decision in which the court did not question the continued validity
of SEC Rule 14e-l, see L.P. Acquisition Co. v. Tyson, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,271 (6th
Cir. Aug. 26, 1985).
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are traditionally within the province of state law, and the enactment
of the federal statutes, including the Williams Act, was not intended
to alter this allocation of federal and state authority. 7
The Court buttressed its comments on fairness with a policy
argument: if judges had the power to decide whether a tender offer
was unfair, then uncertainty would be injected into the tender offer
process, and it would be impossible to tell, before the close of the
offer, whether fully disclosed actions of one side or the other might
eventually be judged to be manipulative. Furthermore, "[t]his uncer-
tainty would directly contradict the expressed Congressional desire to
give investors full information. '78
Thus, in the Court's view, disclosure was the sole purpose of the
Williams Act, which has "sweeping disclosure requirements and nar-
row substantive safeguards."'79 These substantive provisions80 were
intended only to implement and support the disclosure provisions of
the Williams Act.81 Section 14(e) is simply one of these disclosure
provisions, which are intended to give shareholders confronted with a
tender offer the opportunity to make an informed decision. 2
77. In Santa Fe, the Court said: "Absent a clear indication of congressional intent, we are
reluctant to federalize the substantial portion of the law of corporations that deals with
transactions in securities, particularly where established state policies of corporate regulation
would be overridden." 430 U.S. at 479. In Schreiber, the district court stated: "The
unfairness of a securities transaction, absent deception, . . . is not the primary concern of the
federal securities laws; rather, this is a concern of state law." Schreiber, 568 F. Supp. at 202
(citing Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 478-80). Nevertheless, it has been suggested that the Supreme
Court's earlier decision in Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982), in which the Court held
that an Illinois tender offer statute was in violation of the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution, now raises a question, in view of the Schreiber decision, as to whether the states
have the power to regulate unfair defensive tactics. Ferrara & Carroll, Tender Offer
Developments: 1985 Midyear Review, Legal Times, Aug. 5, 1985, at 12, col. 1. There is no
suggestion in the Schreiber opinion, however, that the Court meant to limit the ability of state
legislatures or judges to regulate the fiduciary duties of corporate directors (as opposed to
enforcing state anti-takeover statutes), an area in which state corporate law has traditionally
governed. Moreover, the fact that the Court cited Santa Fe with approval seems to indicate
that it did not intend to depart from the view expressed in that decision that "state fiduciary
standards" should govern the internal affairs of corporations. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 479.
78. Schreiber, 105 S. Ct. at 2465.
79. Id.
80. Exchange Act §§ 14(d)(5)-(7), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(d)(5)-(7) (substantive provisions
governing the manner of making tender offers). Section 14(d)(5) gives certain withdrawal
rights to shareholders who have tendered their shares; section 14(d)(6) deals with prorationing
where a tender offeror is not required by the terms of the tender offer to purchase all the shares
that have been tendered; and section 14(d)(7) requires a tender offeror to pay the same price
for all shares purchased.
81. These provisions "require or prohibit certain acts so that investors will possess
additional time within which to take advantage of the disclosed information." Schreiber, 105
S. Ct. at 2463 (footnote omitted).
82. The Court reasoned:
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In Schreiber, the Court made explicit the seminal ruling that it
had handed down eight years earlier in Santa Fe that the focus of the
federal securities laws is on full disclosure-not only is disclosure the
"facial and primary concern" of section 14(e), but disclosure is
described as "the core of the Act." 3 Thus, the Court asserted that
disclosure is the primary purpose not only of section 14(e) and the
Williams Act, but also of the federal securities laws generally. 4 Both
Santa Fe and Schreiber make clear that, even though the principal
purpose of the securities laws is protection of investors, conduct that
adversely affects investors is not necessarily covered by the securities
laws. Such conduct, if nondeceptive, is traditionally the province of
state corporate law. 5
It is this writer's belief that the Court's decision in Schreiber is
entirely consistent with the intention of Congress in 1934 when it
enacted the Exchange Act, and in 1968 when it enacted the Williams
Act. Furthermore, Schreiber is consistent with the numerous lower
court decisions that have rejected claims that a wide variety of defen-
sive tactics against takeovers were manipulative.8 6  The important
Congress' consistent emphasis on disclosure persuades us that it intended
takeover contests to be addressed to shareholders .... The same Congress that
placed such emphasis on shareholder choice would not at the same time have
required judges to oversee tender offers for substantive fairness. It is even less
likely that a Congress implementing that intention would express it only through
the use of a single word placed in the middle of a provision otherwise devoted to
disclosure.
Id. at 2465.
83. Id. at 2462-63.
84. This, of course, is not exactly a novel thesis. See L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF
SECURITIES REGULATION 29-38 (1983) (Professor Loss makes clear that disclosure, not
substantive regulation, was the basic philosophy of this New Deal legislation).
85. I am indebted to my colleague Professor Bailey Kuklin for the suggestion that many
philosophers of ethics have believed that taking property by deception is a worse offense than
taking by force. Cicero observed, "Now wrongdoing originates in one of two ways: either by
force or by deception; deception is like a little fox, force like a lion. Both are most
uncharacteristic of man, but deception should arouse greater contempt." CICERO, DE
OFFICns 22-23 (H. Edinger trans. 1974). Another philosopher commented:
Deception deprives a person of the information he or she needs in order to
choose rationally for himself or herself. Deception, like coercion, is a form of
manipulating the data on which a person counts, in order to make him do what
the deceiver wants him to do. Where it is successful, the deceived becomes in the
same manner the unwilling tool.
F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 143-44 (1960).
Limiting the scope of the federal securities laws to the more serious type of wrongdoing is
consistent with the notion that these statutes should deal with the more egregious problems,
leaving run-of-the-mill offenses to state law.
86. Before Schreiber, holdings that nondeceptive conduct was not manipulative were
usually based on the Supreme Court's opinion in Santa Fe. See supra text accompanying notes
60-61.
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exception, of course, was Mobil, in which the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that a lock-up option designed to deny a successful
tender offeror the fruits of its victory was manipulative under section
14(e). s7 Schreiber, however, has now overruled Mobil.
Specific defensive tactics against hostile takeovers that have sur-
vived challenges that they were manipulative include the purchase of
assets from persons likely to favor incumbent management, in
exchange for authorized but unissued stock;8  the sale of treasury
stock to a third party and the grant to the same party of a right of first
refusal to buy one of the target company's divisions; 9 the sale of a
substantial asset to a third party in the face of a hostile tender offer; 90
the grant of an option to a friendly party to purchase sufficient
authorized but unissued shares to make it mathematically impossible
for a hostile tender offeror to achieve control; 91 and the making of a
87. See supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
88. Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. Standard Metals Corp., 541 F. Supp. 1109 (W.D. Okla.
1982). The court said:
These transactions do not rise to the level of violating the federal securities laws
simply because the holders of the newly issued stock are favorable to the
incumbent management. If Standard Metals has received inadequate
consideration for its stock, the defendants may be held liable for mismanagement
of corporate assets under the appropriate state law.
Id. at 1113 (citing Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977)).
89. Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn, 537 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). As to the plaintiff's
claim that the decision in Mobil was controlling, the court stated:
I doubt that decision represents the law in this [the Second] circuit. In my view
the reasoning of that decision could unduly interfere with the right of company
management to combat a takeover attempt that it believes in good faith to be
harmful to its share holders....
But even if the Mobil decision represented controlling law, it does not
compel an injunction on these facts. The ... purchase agreement is not merely
an option, although defeasible in certain circumstances. It was not set at a
bargain price, even though the tender offer price was soon raised above it. The
right of first refusal ... is not an option and is not calculated to effectuate a sale
below market value. I conclude that the Mobil case is properly distinguished
even if it represents the law.
Id. at 422.
90. Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. 11. 1982).
91. Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1052 (1984). The district court, however, had held that this defensive tactic was
manipulative under section 14(e). In a lengthy and highly interesting opinion, Judge Sofaer
took the position that Santa Fe was not controlling in an action under section 14(e), because
the purpose of the Williams Act (of which section 14(e) is a part) is not only to provide
information to shareholders confronted with a tender offer, but also to prohibit conduct that
"unduly impedes the shareholders' exercise of the decision-making prerogative guaranteed to
them by Congress." Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 1538, 1545
(S.D.N.Y. 1983). Judge Sofaer's decision was reversed by the Second Circuit, in an opinion
that explicitly rejected Mobil as an "unwarranted extension of the Williams Act," Data Probe,
722 F.2d at 5 (citation omitted). See also Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757, 760
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1018 (1983).
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counter-tender offer for the shares of the tender offeror.92 In one lead-
ing case, the plaintiff took the position that management's failure to
disclose its alleged long-standing policy of perpetuating its control by
opposing any takeover supplied the nondisclosure necessary to make
out a case of manipulation under sections 10(b) and 14(e). The dis-
trict court, citing Santa Fe, concluded that there was no support for
this argument. 93
Although decided before Schreiber, all of these cases seem fully
consistent with it. Very few decisions hold that fully disclosed defen-
sive tactics are manipulative under the federal securities laws, and
Schreiber appears to deprive these decisions of any remaining validity
they might have had.94 After Schreiber, there seems to be little possi-
bility that defensive measures taken by target-company management
can be successfully attacked under the federal securities laws, assum-
ing that the tactics are fully and accurately disclosed.
In examining the allegations of the complaint in Schreiber, one
cannot help being struck by how different they are from the claims
that are typically made in a manipulation case. Notably, the com-
plaint does not allege that the defendants intended to affect, or had
any financial interest in affecting, the market price of El Paso stock.95
The gravamen of the charge appears to be that Burlington's
92. Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623 (D. Md. 1982). In language
that seems to forecast that of the Supreme Court in Schreiber, the district court said: "Section
14(e) is solely a disclosure provision. Congress has not authorized the federal judiciary to
scrutinize the substantive fairness of tender offers as long as adequate disclosure is made." Id.
at 628 (citation omitted).
93. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 486 F. Supp. 1168, 1186 (N.D. Ill. 1980), aff'd, 646
F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981). The court also held that, because the
sole purpose of the Williams Act was the protection of investors who are confronted with a
tender offer, there could be no violation of section 14(e) unless a tender offer was actually
made, or at least announced. Id. at 1187-88.
94. See Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Abrams, 510 F. Supp. 860, 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(A tender offeror, Seagram, charged that the directors of the target company, St. Joe Minerals
Corporation, had a plan to "sell off its assets and, failing this, to destroy the charter of the
company," in order to defeat the tender offer.). According to the district court, the suit was
brought under section 14(e), "presumably on the theory that an improper manipulation of the
market is in progress by the moves of the St. Joe directors." Id. The plaintiff also claimed that
the target had purchased shares at a price of $60 per share in order to defeat a tender offer at a
price of $45 per share and that the directors were determined to keep control, regardless of the
company's best interests or the wishes of the shareholders. Judge Pollack granted a temporary
restraining order against this "scorched earth" policy, pending a full-scale factual hearing, in
the "interests of potential and actual stockholders and investors and the integrity of the
market." Id. at 862. The opinion does not, however, discuss the issue of manipulation, and it
seems to be based at least partly on the state-law grounds of breach of the directors' fiduciary
duties.
95. "The main inquiry in all manipulation cases has been toward establishing the purpose
for which the more easily proved trading activity was undertaken." Note, Regulation of Stock
Market Manipulation, supra note 23, at 526.
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"improper termination and withdrawal of the [December] tender offer
constituted a willful breach of the tender offer agreements" between
the Burlington and the El Paso shareholders.9 6 In fact, the Third Cir-
cuit's opinion in the case stated that the plaintiff's theory of recovery
based on manipulation "seeks to convert an arguable breach of con-
tract into a violation of the Williams Act."9 7
Given the fact that the plaintiffs in Schreiber did not allege that
the defendants were attempting to influence the market price of El
Paso stock, the Supreme Court might well have decided the case on
the grounds that the defendants were not acting with a manipulative
intent, and that the creation of an "artificial" market price for the
stock would at most be an unintended side effect of the defendants'
actions.9" The Supreme Court in Schreiber, however, its only decision
that is squarely on the subject of manipulation,99 leaves open several
important questions: What is the nature of the misrepresentation or
nondisclosure that is a requisite for manipulation?1" Does a failure
by the defendant to reveal the motives for, or the possible conse-
quences of, his actions provide the necessary nondisclosure? What is
the nature of the intent that must be proved? Does the intent require-
ment differ for different methods of manipulation? These questions
will be addressed in Part V of this Article.
96. Joint Appendix at JA-13-14, Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 731 F.2d 163 (3d Cir.
1984), aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 2458 (1985) (Second Amended Class Action Complaint, 25(a)).
97. Schreiber, 731 F.2d at 165. There is some authority for saying that courts will examine
the overall gravamen of a complaint in order to determine whether it states a cause of action
for manipulation. For example, in Nash v. Farmers' New World Life Ins. Co., minority
shareholders claimed that the allegedly unfair terms of a merger constituted manipulation
within the meaning of section 10(b). 570 F.2d 558 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 822 (1978).
After citing the "term of art" language in Santa Fe, the court said in affirming dismissal of
the complaint: "The gravamen of Appellant's claim is that the merger terms were unfair, not
that Defendants manipulated prices." Id. at 562 (footnotes omitted).
98. For a discussion of manipulative intent, see 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION
1551-52 (2d ed. 1961). See also Note, Regulation of Stock Market Manipulation, supra note 23,
at 512-16 (analyzing methods of market manipulation); Comment, Market Manipulation and
the Securities Exchange Act, supra note 23, at 634 (noting the difficulty of proving even large
scale manipulation).
99. The facts of neither Hochfelder nor Santa Fe involved manipulation. The discussion of
manipulation in these two opinions was part of a general discussion of section 10(b). In
Hochfelder, the Court held that a cause of action under section 10(b) required scienter. 425
U.S. 185, 193 (1976). In Santa Fe, that deception was an essential element of a violation of
section 10(b). 430 U.S. 462, 473-74 (1977). See supra text accompanying notes 58-61.
100. The district court in Schreiber stated that "deception alone is not manipulation under
Section 14(e). The manipulative activity must artificially affect the market price and do so in a
misleading or deceptive manner." 568 F. Supp. at 202. The Supreme Court did not comment
on this question, presumably because it was not necessary to do so in order to decide the case
before it.
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III. MANIPULATION BEFORE 1934
In 1934, Congress gave the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") authority to prohibit "any manipulative.., device or contri-
vance" in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 10 In
view of the sparseness of the legislative history that bears on the
meaning of the undefined term "manipulative,"' °2 it is important to
understand what the framers of the Exchange Act meant when they
used this term. 103
As Chief Justice Burger stated in Schreiber, the narrow meaning
that the Supreme Court gave to the term "manipulative" in that deci-
sion is consistent with the common law."° As will be seen, however,
not all practices that were regarded as manipulative in 1934 were
actionable or illegal under the common law.' Indeed, one of the
purposes of the Exchange Act was to make illegal certain stock-mar-
ket practices that were then regarded as manipulative but were not
illegal. It is therefore relevant also to know what the term meant to
the financial community and others before enactment of the federal
securities laws. Fortunately, in addition to judicial decisions, 06 there
is a rich literature that describes stock market practices that were
regarded as manipulative before enactment of the Exchange Act in
1934. These materials include legislative reports, 107 but also more
informal materials such as works by financial historians, 18 contempo-
raneous accounts and memoirs of Wall Street operators, 109 and even
101. Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
102. See infra text accompanying notes 252-55.
103. Where the meaning of an undefined term in the federal securities laws "had been
crystallized by . . .prior judicial interpretation .. .[i]t is ... reasonable to attach that
meaning to the term as used by Congress. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298
(1946).
104. Schreiber, 105 S. Ct. at 2462. To support this statement, the Court cited Professor
Loss's treatise, L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 984-89 (1983), as well
as two pre-1934 cases, the English case of Scott v. Brown, Doering, McNab & Co., [1892] 1
Q.B. 724, 724 (C.A.), and United States v. Brown, 5 F. Supp. 81, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), aff'd,
79 F.2d 321 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 650 (1935). For discussion of the cases, see infra
text accompanying notes 145, 160-64.
105. See infra text accompanying notes 159, 165-67.
106. See, e.g., People v. Rice, 221 A.D. 443, 223 N.Y.S. 566 (1927); Ridgely v. Keene, 134
A.D. 647, 119 N.Y.S. 451 (1909); Rex v. DeBerenger, 3 M. & S. 67, 105 Eng. Rep. (K.B.
1814).
107. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, STOCK
EXCHANGE PRACTICES, S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
108. See, e.g., J. BROOKS, ONCE IN GOLCONDA (1969); M. JOSEPHSON, THE ROBBER
BARONS (1934).
109. See, e.g., J. DILLON, HIND-SIGHTS, OR LOOKING BACKWARD AT SWINDLES (1911);
W. FOWLER, TEN YEARS IN WALL STREET (1870); J. MEDBERY, MEN AND MYSTERIES OF
WALL STREET (1878); D. SALMON, CONFESSIONS OF A FORMER CUSTOMERS' MAN (1932);




The Exchange Act's prohibition of certain specific manipulative
practices in section 9(a),I' coupled with the grant of authority to the
SEC in section 10(b) to make unlawful new manipulative practices, I 2
is persuasive evidence that Congress did not intend to limit the defini-
tion of manipulation to those practices that were known and regarded
as manipulative in 1934.113 Congress regarded manipulation as a flex-
ible concept that could encompass schemes that might hatch in the
future from the fertile and creative brains of dishonest market
operators.
Nonetheless, there must be a limit to the flexibility of this con-
cept. Unless the term "manipulation" has a central core of meaning,
section 10(b) could be interpreted as giving the SEC the authority to
forbid any practice (in connection with the purchase or sale of a
security) of which it disapproved.' 14 There is no evidence that Con-
gress intended to bestow such unlimited discretion on the courts or on
the new agency that it set up in 1934 to police the securities markets.
A. Manipulative Practices
What, then, did the term "manipulation," as it referred to the
stock market, mean in 1934? Beginning at least as early as the middle
of the nineteenth century and continuing until the very time that Con-
gress considered the bill that was to become the Exchange Act, the
most important market manipulations were the work of groups of
speculators known as pools. " 5 During the nineteenth century, before
a substantial portion of the public had become accustomed to invest-
110. See, e.g., E. LEFEVRE, SAMPSON ROCK OF WALL STREET (1906); N. RIDGELY, BY
LAW OF MIGHT (1908); A. TRAIN, PAPER PROFITS (1930).
111. See Exchange Act § 9(a)(l)-(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(1)-(5).
112. Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C § 78j(b).
113. Section 10(b) "was described rightly as a 'catchall' clause to enable the Commission to
deal with new manipulative [or cunning] devices.'" Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185, 203 (1976).
114. In Schreiber, the Court expressed concern, for policy reasons, with the idea of giving
unfettered discretion to judges to determine which acts are manipulative: "Inviting judges to
read the term 'manipulative' with their own sense of what constitutes 'unfair' or 'artificial'
conduct would inject uncertainty into the tender offer process." 105 S. Ct. at 2464-65. See
supra text accompanying notes 75-76.
For an instructive and entertaining debate between Professors H.L.A. Hart and Lon L.
Fuller about interpreting words used in statutes, see Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A
Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 661-69 (1958); Hart, Positivism and the
Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 606-08 (1958).
115. "[T]he most important [manipulative] market campaigns.., are the work of groups
organized into syndicates, pools or joint accounts." TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, supra note
4, at 445.
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ing in shares of stock' 1 6 and before issuers of securities had large capi-
talizations, 1 7 pool operations usually consisted of struggles between
groups of professional speculators who were known either as "bulls"
or as "bears. " Typically, bears would sell a stock short (that is, sell
shares that they did not own, borrowing shares in order to make
delivery to the buyers) and then try to force down the price of the
stock, in order to cover their short positions at a low price. Bulls, on
the other hand, would try to "comer" the stock (that is, obtain con-
trol over the entire available supply) in order to force the bears to buy
stock from the bulls, at prices dictated by the bulls, in order to meet
their (the bears') contractual commitments." 9
In light of the Schreiber decision, it is most interesting to observe
that deceit was an essential element of these early manipulative opera-
tions of pools or, as they were sometimes called, "rings."' 120 Accord-
ing to an 1870 account:
The ring [of bulls] having been made up, they proceed to buy the
stock. Two requisites are necessary to every successful ring; first
secrecy, second, simulation.... Every possible method is taken to
deceive those that are outside the ring, and prevent them from sup-
posing that the stock is passing under the control of the party who
116. For much of the nineteenth century, the individual investor of modest means did not
participate in the stock market to any appreciable degree. See V. CAROSSO, INVESTMENT
BANKING IN AMERICA 14-16 (1970). Not until the government's sale of "Liberty Bonds" to
finance United States participation in World War I did public investors become an important
source of capital. "Whereas bankers had estimated the bond market in 1917 at 350,000
individuals, the number subscribing to the first Liberty Loan was over 4 million and was much
larger for the second, third, fourth, and fifth loans-9.4, 18.4, 22.8 and 11.8 million,
respectively." U.S. TREASURY, ANNUAL REPORT (1918 & 1919), reprinted in V. CAROSSO,
supra, at 226. For the first time, millions of Americans learned that intangible property could
make money for them. For a description of how a major investment banking house promoted
the sale of Liberty Bonds, see V. CAROSSO, supra, at 227.
117. Before the rise of industrialization in the late nineteenth century, most businesses were
small, had few capital needs and, accordingly, issued small numbers of corporate shares.
Nevertheless, with the growth of large businesses, particularly the railroads, industry began to
issue shares in greater amounts in order to acquire the funds needed for expansion. V.
CAROSSO, supra note 116, at 29-31. World War I and the ensuing economic boom had a
profound effect upon this youthful corporate structure. "Security issues followed one another
in rapid succession and, whereas before World War I an issue of one million dollars was
considered large, in the middle 20's issues of twenty and twenty-five million dollars were by no
means unusual." United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). Accord R.
SOBEL, THE CURBSTONE BROKERS 171-72 (1970).
118. A nineteenth century writer gave the following explanation of these terms: "If you are
long, you are a bull; if short, a bear.... If a bear finds anything in his peregrinations, whether
it be a turkey on the roost or a man in a tree, he lifts his paw and pulls it down. The bull, on
the contrary, lowers his head only to give men and things a decided upward tendency." J.
MEDBERY, supra note 109, at 81.
119. W. FOWLER, supra note 109, at 26-32.
120. Id. at 28.
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are [sic] manipulating it. Sometimes the stock is made to assume a
weakness, ... and all sorts of reports are set afloat to depreciate its
value. 121
With the entry of a broader spectrum of the public into the stock
market, particularly after the First World War,1 22 and the appearance
of publicly held companies with a large number of outstanding
shares,123 the objectives of pool operators shifted toward separating
public investors, rather than other professional traders, from their
money. 24 Deception was an essential element of the manipulative
tactics used by pools during the 1920's and right up to the time of
passage of the Exchange Act. 25
121. Id. at 30-32 (emphasis added). Later (the same account continues), after the bears
have been induced to take short positions:
[D]ifferent brokers are employed to bid up the price in the market in order to
frighten the bears, and at the same time they are notified to deliver the stock
which they have borrowed of the ring .... Sometimes, instead of buying the
stock, the bears 'settle' with the ring by paying them the difference between the
market price and the lower price, at which they [sold short]. In that case, the
ring find themselves saddled with a large amount of stock, for which there is little
demand. And now the problem is to unload. Accordingly, they sell enough
stock to 'break' the market 4 or 5 percent downwards. The bears rush in and sell
at the lowered price. When the ring have taken a sufficient number of their
contracts, they bid the stock up again, and compel the bears again to cover.
Every time the stock rises sharply, it has such an appearance of strength ...
that many of the outside bulls are tempted into buying, and sell out at a loss,
when the stock declines.
Id. at 31-32.
122. See supra notes 116-17.
123. See supra note 117. During the 1920's, the annual issues of domestic corporate
securities more than tripled. V. CAROSSO, supra note 116, at 243-44.
124. In the 1920's, the general public began to participate in stock market speculation for
the first time. See supra note 116. Because the vast majority of post-war public investors were
ignorant of the inner workings of Wall Street, they were prime candidates for manipulation by
pool operators. See J. BROOKS, supra note 108, at 67-74. Thus, by 1933, the victims of pools
were primarily members of the public rather than other professionals. For a discussion of the
direct effect of manipulation upon the public, see TwENTIETH CENTURY FUND, supra note 4,
at 502-03.
125. See J. BROOKS, supra note 108, at 65-66, 71; F. PECORA, WALL STREET UNDER OATH
passim (1968).
The testimony [before the United States Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency from January 1933 to July 1934] had brought to light a shocking
corruption in our banking system, a widespread repudiation of old fashioned
standards of honesty and fair dealing in the creation and sale of securities, and a
merciless exploitation of the vicious possibilities of intricate corporate chicanery.
The public had been deeply aroused by the spectacle of cynical disregard of
fiduciary duty on the part of many of its most respected leaders; of directors, who
conveniently subordinated their official obligations to an avid pursuit of personal
gain; of great banks, which combined the functions of a bank with those of a
stock jobber; of supposedly impartial public markets for the sale of securities,
actually operated as private clubs for the individual benefit of their members.
F. PECORA, supra, at 283-84.
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In a typical manipulative pool, members of the top management
of the company whose stock was to be manipulated 12 6 and a number
of Wall Street operators, 127 often including the specialist in the stock
(that is, the New York Stock Exchange member to whom the
Exchange had entrusted the task of making a market in the stock) 128
would first acquire options from the company that would enable them
to buy its stock with a minimal investment. They would then use a
number of devices to "create a kind of price mirage which may lure
an outsider into the market to his damage."' 129 One such device was
to spread false information about the potential earnings or operations
of the company. 3° "Word of mouth rumor-mongering was aug-
mented by the use of fake financial services, tip sheets, bribed financial
writers, and bribed customers' men or brokers who, without disclos-
ing their financial interests, would recommend [the stock]."'' The
success of the manipulation could also be promoted "by the spreading
of advance notice among persons anxious to get in on the ground
floor."
13 2
Where, as was often the case, the stock being manipulated was
traded on a stock exchange, the most effective way of inducing mem-
bers of the public to buy the shares was to falsify the appearance of
the market itself by causing transactions to appear on the exchange's
ticker tape that did not represent the free play of supply and
demand. 33  Because all transactions in stocks traded on a stock
exchange were promptly reported on the exchange's ticker tape,
126. Id. at 270-82; Comment, Market Manipulation and the Securities Exchange Act, supra
note 23, at 626-28.
127. See F. PECORA, supra note 125, at 270-82; Comment, Market Manipulation and the
Securities Exchange Act, supra note 23, at 626-28.
128. "The testimony of members of the New York Stock Exchange given before the Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency tends to confirm the common knowledge of 'the Street'
that collusion with specialists has been a method of price manipulation used by pools."
TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, STOCK MARKET CONTROL 11l (E. Clark, A. Bernheim, J.
Dewhurst, M. Schneider eds. (1934). "[T]he specialist in the manipulated stock is an
invaluable ally of the pool." Note, Manipulation of the Stock Markets Under the Securities
Laws, supra note 23, at 662. Accord Comment, Market Manipulation and the Securities
Exchange Act, supra note 23, at 626-28.
129. United States v. Brown, 5 F. Supp. 81, 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), aff'd, 79 F.2d 321 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 650 (1935). See infra notes 161-62.
130. See Harris v. United States, 48 F.2d 771 (9th Cir. 1931); Note, Regulation of Stock
Market Manipulation, supra note 23, at 512.
131. Note, Regulation of Stock Market Manipulation, supra note 23, at 512.
132. Id.
133. "The most effective manner of inducing others to purchase is to have a favorable ticker
tape record which indicates to prospective purchasers that others consider the security to be
underpriced." Comment, Market Manipulation and the Securities Exchange Act, supra note
23, at 627. A 1930 fictional account of Wall Street operations states: "There was no need to
give out any bull tips .... [The pool operator's] job was to seek directly to influence public
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which could be seen by brokers and investors in brokerage offices
throughout the country, a skillfully orchestrated campaign of buying
and selling shares in order to create bogus prices was a highly effective
form of misrepresentation. 3 4 As one financial historian has stated:
"The point of a pool operation was simplicity itself: it was a way of
inducing the Stock Exchange ticker tape to tell a story that was essen-
tially false, and thus to deceive the public." 3 '
The crudest way of misrepresenting the market was the "wash
sale," in which the manipulator gave an order to sell shares of stock to
one broker and an order to buy the same number of shares of the
same stock at the same price to another broker.'36 The transaction
that was consequently printed on the ticker tape was a total falsehood
because it did not represent any change of beneficial ownership of the
security.' 37 Only a shade less deceptive was the "matched order," in
which the manipulator traded with a confederate for the purpose of
creating an appearance of trading activity or a change of price in the
market.' 38
Although the spreading of false information about the company,
sentiment by the best possible kind of publicity-that of the tape." A. TRAIN, supra note 110,
at 259-60.
134. A pool "is dug by a group of gambling gentlemen. These philanthropists collect
a sizable wad of stock at low prices. Then they tell the public that they intend to
buy a lot more and shoot the price of the stock sky-high, or, perhaps, even higher
than that. The pool now "creates activity" in the stock by buying and selling its
shares to one another, or to their friends, at slightly advancing prices.
Old John B. Public excitedly swallows his Adam's apple, While he pop-
eyedly absorbs the "information" fed out by the altruistic birds who are
preparing to take him for a ride and send him home in a barrel....
Finally the psychic pressure becomes too great, and John makes a flying leap
for the bait....
D. SALMON, supra note 109, at 124.
135. J. BROOKS, supra note 108, at 69.
136. Note, Regulation of Stock Market Manipulation, supra note 23, at 513.
137. Manipulation by falsifying the market is not limited to the securities markets. For
example, in July 1985 David Bathurst resigned from his position as chairman of Christie's, the
international auction house, after admitting in the course of litigation that he had falsely
reported that three Impressionist paintings had been sold at auction for a total of $5.6 million,
whereas only one of these paintings had been sold, for $2.2 million. The other two paintings
had not attracted large enough bids for them to be sold. The "phantom sales" of the two
paintings were recorded by several publications that keep track of art prices:
Mr. Bathurst said that he made the false report to help the owner of the paintings
because it is more difficult to sell art privately if it does not do well at auction,
and to maintain stability in the art market which might have become depressed if
the public immediately discovered that only one painting was sold.
Christie's Chairman Admits to False Report, N.Y. Times, July 8, 1985, at C13, col. 4; McGill,
Christie's Chairman Quits in False Sale Case, N.Y. Times, July 20, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
138. Note, Regulation of Stock Market Manipulation, supra note 23, at 513. Accord
Comment, Market Manipulation and the Securities Exchange Act, supra note 23, at 627.
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bribery of salesmen and financial writers, wash sales, and matched
orders were often used by pool operators, sometimes in combination
with each other, an equally commonly used manipulative device
appears to have been the effecting of bona fide purchases and sales in a
manner that was designed to lure the public into the market.' 3 9 A
skillful manipulator could play on the gullibility and greed of the pub-
lic with incredible effect." 3 An account in a 1930 novel about Wall
Street gives a good picture of how it was done:
Shelton [the pool operator] has begun [the manipulation] by bid-
ding up the price on small lots. The floor traders, seeing the
stock's apparent buoyancy, had begun to buy in anticipation of a
rise, and this had resulted in an increased demand which Shelton
had satisfied out of the stock which he himself had just bought....
This had in turn naturally checked the buying and, when the price
began to sag in consequence, he had repurchased the stock he had
just sold a point or two higher up thus creating a new appearance
of strength. While the process was in fact simplicity itself, it gave
the effect of great activity and widespread buying which could not
fail to have an effect upon the susceptible public.' 4 '
Lest the reader dismiss this description of a manipulation as
mere fictional fantasy, it should be pointed out that a real pool opera-
tion in 1933, only a few months before the Exchange Act was enacted,
used methods such as these to run the price of a stock up from twenty
to ninety within two months. The price then plummeted from ninety
to thirty in only four days, when the pool operators withdrew their
support for the stock, after disposing of their holdings at a profit. 14 2
And this situation was in no way exceptional: during 1929 alone, 105
stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange were the subject of
139. See United States v. Brown, 5 F. Supp. 81, 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), aff'd, 79 F.2d 321 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 650 (1935).
140. A leading authority on security analysis has observed that securities markets are
unusual in that price rises often attract buyers, while price declines attract sellers. Referring to
"technical analysis" of the market, he has written:
The one principle that applies to nearly all these so-called "technical
approaches" is that one should buy because a stock or the market has gone up
and one should sell because it has declined. This is the exact opposite of sound
business sense everywhere else, and it is most unlikely that it can lead to lasting
success in Wall Street.
B. GRAHAM, THE INTELLIGENT INVESTOR x (4th ed. 1973).
It is of course this tendency of investors (or speculators) to "follow the market" by buying
or selling in accordance with market trends that makes it possible for manipulators to succeed
in their efforts to draw the public in by falsifying the market.
141. A. TRAIN, supra note 110, at 146.
142. F. PECORA, supra note 125, at 270-82.
[Vol. 40:671
STOCK MARKET MANIPULATION
pools managed by member firms of the Exchange.'43
Compared with the crude and direct deception involved in activi-
ties such as spreading false publicity, touting, wash sales, or matched
orders, manipulation by means of actual purchases and sales was a
relatively sophisticated technique. Yet this technique was equally
deceptive, even though each purchase or sale effected by the pool
operator was an actual market transaction that placed the members of
the pool at the risk of the market and was not the product of prear-
rangement among confederates trading with each other in the market.
But while this method was more subtle than that of the cruder manip-
ulative practices, its aim was identical: to give a "false appearance to
the market for a security in order to deceive others trading in the
market and thus to influence them to by or sell in accordance with the
manipulator's desire.""' The Schreiber Court summed up the essen-
tially deceptive nature of manipulation when it pointed out that Scott
v. Brown, Doering, McNab & Co., a nineteenth century seminal Eng-
lish case "which broke new ground in recognizing that manipulation
could occur without the dissemination of false statements, nonetheless
placed emphasis on the presence of deception. As Lord Lopes stated
in that case, 'I can see no substantial distinction between false rumors
and false and fictitious acts.' "145
B. Manipulation Under the Common Law
While all of these practices were regarded as manipulative and
condemned by many observers of the stock market during the early
twentieth century, the American legal system did not proscribe all of
them.'46 To be sure, spreading false information in order to influence
securities prices was condemned under the common law as fraud. 4 7
143. Note, Manipulation of the Stock Markets Under the Securities Laws, supra note 23, at
661.
144. Loomis, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,
28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 214, 241 (1959).
145. Schreiber, 105 S. Ct. at 2462 n.4 (citing Scott v. Brown, Doering, McNab & Co.,
[1892] 1 Q.B. 724 (C.A.)).
146. See infra text accompanying notes 159, 165-67.
147. It seems to be an established rule of law that any statement of any kind issued
by anyone and intended to affect the price of, or to be used in appraising, a
security must be accurate; and that the knowing publisher of false information is
liable on an action of fraud to anyone who relies on it, or probably, even to
anyone who acts to his loss in the open market on a false valuation as a result of
such statement.
Berle, Liability for Stock Market Manipulation, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 264, 268 (1931). See
Bedford v. Bagshaw, 4 H. & N. 538 (1859) (where the defendant made false representations to
the London Stock Exchange that caused the Exchange to list the company's shares, the plain-
tiff, a purchaser of these shares in the market, was awarded damages in an action for deceit).
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Not only was it grounds for criminal prosecution, 4 8 but a contract to
manipulate by this means was unenforceable, 4 9 and the manipulators
could be held liable to a person who bought at a price affected by the
manipulation. 50 In the latter type of action, it was not necessary for
the plaintiff to establish that he had relied upon, or had even heard or
read, the false information; it was sufficient to prove that the "effect of
the statement was to create a false valuation or appraisal by the...
market, and the buyer relied upon the state of the market."'' A. A.
Berle, Jr. wrote in 1931 that in this event "[tlhe chain of causation
between the statement relied upon and the price adopted by the inves-
tor is slightly longer than the ordinary case of deceit, but is no less
direct."152
In general, the early twentieth century saw an increasing ten-
dency to apply legal sanctions to various forms of manipulation. At
least as early as 1909, wash sales were considered to be "illegal and
immoral contracts" which the courts would not enforce. 5 3 A person
found guilty of making a wash sale could be prosecuted under the
New York antifraud statute 154 or, if he were a New York Stock
Exchange member, expelled from the Exchange. 55 Matched orders,
however, were still regarded as enforceable in 1909,1'56 but by 1931, as
concepts of fraud broadened, they had begun to be regarded as fraud-
ulent "fictitious transactions. "157 Touting of stocks through "fake
financial services, ...bribed financial writers, and [the bribing of]
148. People v. Federated Radio Corp., 244 N.Y. 33 (1926); People v. Rice, 221 A.D. 443,
223 N.Y.S. 566 (1927).
149. Bradley v. Bradley, 165 N.Y. 183 (1900); Ridgely v. Keane, 134 A.D. 647, 119 N.Y.S.
451 (1909).
150. Ottinger v. Bennett, 203 N.Y. 554, adopting the appellate division dissenting opinion of
Miller, J., 144 A.D. 525, 129 N.Y.S. 819 (1911); Ridgely v. Keane, 134 A.D. 647, 119 N.Y.S.
451 (1909); Bedford v. Bagshaw, 4 H.& N. 538 (1859). See Berle, Liability for Stock Market
Manipulation, supra note 147, at 268-72. See generally 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION
1535-40 (2d ed. 1961) (litigation over manipulation prior to the securities statutes).
151. Berle, Liability for Stock Market Manipulation, supra note 147, at 269.
152. Id. It therefore appears that the "fraud on the market" concept, which has been used
in recent years by several federal courts to provide the causative link in private actions for
misrepresentation under Rule lOb-5, can trace its lineage to the pre-1934 common law of
manipulation. See infra note 273 and text accompanying notes 273, 275-79.
153. Ridgely v. Keane, 134 A.D. 647, 119 N.Y.S. 451 (1909); REPORT OF THE
GOVERNOR'S COMMITrEE ON SPECULATION IN SECURITIES AND COMMODITIES (THE
HUGHES REPORT) (1909), reprinted in W. VAN ANTWERP, supra note 109, at 421-23.
154. People v. Rice, 221 A.D. 443, 223 N.Y.S. 566 (1927). See also People v. Federated
Radio Corp., 244 N.Y. 33 (1926) (holding defendants liable under the New York antifraud
statute for printing deceptive advertisements designed to sell securities).
155. J. DILLON, supra note 109, at 62.
156. W. VAN ANTWERP, supra note 109, at 423.
157. Harris v. United States, 48 F.2d 771 (9th Cir. 1931).
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brokers" likewise were classed as fraudulent practices. 15 8
The effecting of actual transactions for the purpose of influencing
its price by inducing others to buy or sell a security, though com-
monly viewed as manipulative, remained legal in the United States
until the enactment of the Exchange Act.'5 9 The 1933 decision of
Judge Woolsey in United States v. Brown 160 has sometimes been cited
for the proposition that manipulation by actual trading was illegal in
the United States before 1934, indicating that deception was not a
necessary element of manipulation under the common law. 6' The
language used in Judge Woolsey's opinion, however, treats manipula-
tion as a sophisticated form of deception.162 Furthermore, the case
actually involved wash sales, payments to publicity agents and bro-
kers to tout the stock, and "false and fraudulent representations and
statements;"' 163 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
lower court's decision on the narrow ground of conventional fraud.'"
Thus, although manipulation by means of actual purchases and
sales was commonly recognized as manipulative and deceptive,' 65 no
158. Note, Regulation of Stock Market Manipulation, supra note 23, at 512.
159. "In the United States prior to 1934 no case established the illegality of any form of
manipulation by actual purchases and sales ....... Note, Regulation of Stock Market
Manipulation, supra note 23, at 517. In 1931, A. A. Berle, Jr. wrote that under American (as
opposed to English) law:
[A] group may purchase with the sole aim of raising the price or may sell with
the sole aim of depressing it; and granted that they are not connected with the
corporation, or have not in some other way assumed obligations to the market or
to investors in that corporation, the law leaves them strictly alone. In theory,
apparently, reliance is placed upon the risks involved in the transaction to
prevent manipulation of stock prices.
Berle, supra note 147, at 272. Accord Berle, supra note 23, at 406.
160. 5 F. Supp. 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), aff'd, 79 F.2d 321 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 650
(1935).
161. One writer recently stated that in Brown "the culpable conduct consisted of creating a
'controlled market' and artificially raising the quoted price of the stock, not disclosure tainted
by misrepresentation or omission." Note, Target Defensive Tactics as Manipulative Under
Section 14(e), supra note 34, at 248. The quoted statement, that there was no "disclosure
tainted by misrepresentation or omission," would be correct only if one does not regard
falsification of the appearance of the market as a misrepresentation.
162. "[W]hen two or more persons, by a joint effort, raise the price of a listed stock
artificially, they are creating a kind of price mirage which may lure an outsider into the market
to his damage .... [S]uch a procedure would of itself constitute a fraud on the public ......
Brown, 5 F. Supp. at 93.
163. Id.
164. United States v. Brown, 79 F.2d 321, 325-26 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 650
(1935).
165. [W]here a man or group of men purchases stock, not because they appraised the
stock as worth the price, but because thereby they hoped to induce others to
appraise it at that price, the scheme partook of the nature of a conspiracy to
induce others to act on a false assumption, to the profit of the wrongdoers and to
the loss of the outside purchaser.
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case prior to 1934 established its illegality. 166 The 1933 and 1934
hearings of the Senate Banking Committee revealed to the American
public for the first time that manipulative activities were widespread,
that they were practiced by "prominent businessmen and national
figures of both political parties,"' 16 7 and that some of these practices
were perfectly legal under existing law.
By 1934, when the legislation that became the Exchange Act was
being considered by Congress, the term "manipulation" encompassed
a variety of stock market practices, all of which involved deception of
the investing public for the purpose of influencing the market price of
a security for the immediate profit of the manipulators. It is against
this background that the antimanipulative provisions of the Exchange
Act and legislative history of these provisions need to be understood.
IV. THE ANTIMANIPULATIVE PROVISIONS OF
THE EXCHANGE ACT
The Exchange Act deals with the problem of manipulation in
two principal ways. 168 First, in sections 9(a)(1) to 9(a)(5), 16 9 Congress
prohibited certain specific practices, including wash sales, matched
orders, dissemination of false information, and manipulation through
actual trading. Second, in section 10(b), 171 Congress gave the SEC
broad authority to prohibit or regulate "new" forms of manipulation
that might appear in the future. 171
In 1968 Congress enacted additional antimanipulative provisions
Berle, supra note 147, at 272-73.
166. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
167. V. CAROSSO, supra note 116, at 324-25.
168. "The problem of manipulation was attacked by Congress in a number of ways-by
specific prohibitions, by giving the Commission rule-making authority in certain areas, and by
a general prohibition against any trading for a manipulative purpose." 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES
REGULATION 1542 (2d ed. 1961).
In addition to the provisions that prohibited or that gave the SEC authority to prohibit
manipulation, Congress also gave the SEC authority to regulate certain specific practices
affecting the trading markets, such as price stabilization, short selling, stop loss orders, and
trading in options, which had been used in connection with manipulative schemes but which
also appeared to have legitimate functions. See Exchange Act § 9(a)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(6);
Exchange Act § 9(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(b); Exchange Act § 9(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(c); Exchange
Act § 10(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(a).
169. Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(l)-(5).
170. Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
171. "The section was described rightly as a 'catchall' clause to enable the Commission 'to
deal with new manipulative [or cunning] devices.' " Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185, 203 (1976) (footnote omitted). Cf Loomis, supra note 144, at 241. For the complete text
of section 10(b), see supra note 20. In addition, subsections 15(c)(1)-(2), Exchange Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78o(c)(1)-(2), forbid manipulation by brokers and dealers in the over-the-counter
market and provide rule-making authority to the Securities and Exchange Commission.
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as part of the Williams Act.'72 Section 13(e) gives the SEC the
authority to adopt rules prohibiting manipulation in connection with
corporate repurchases of shares; 7 3 and section 14(e) (the provision
under consideration in the Schreiber case) prohibits manipulation in
connection with tender offers.' 7 4
As will be seen, the meaning of manipulation in these separate
provisions is closely interrelated. It should be observed at the outset
of this discussion that the remedies provided by the federal securities
laws are cumulative, and that a cause of action may be stated under
one or more of the general antimanipulative provisions regardless of
whether the conduct involved is of the kind proscribed under another,
more specific prohibition. 17  For example, an independent cause of
action for manipulation can exist under section 10(b) even though one
or more of the elements of a section 9(a) violation may be missing. 176
A. Section 9(a)
Sections 9(a)(1) to 9(a)(5) prohibit practices that had been identi-
fied as manipulative 177 in the congressional hearings that led to enact-
ment of the statute, but not all of these practices were clearly illegal
before 1934. 7 8 In fact, the purpose of section 9(a)(2) was precisely to
make illegal the central activity of the manipulative pools that had
flourished prior to 1934, manipulation by means of actual trading.17 9
172. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
173. Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e).
174. Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e). For the complete text of section 14(e), see supra
note 14. The term "tender offer" is not defined in the Exchange Act. A leading treatise on the
subject defines the term as "simply an invitation to the stockholders of a corporation to tender
a sufficient number of shares for purchase and thereby attain actual or effective control." E.
ARANOW & H. EINHORN, PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 585 (2d ed. 1968).
The question of the meaning of a tender offer has been the subject of a certain amount of
litigation. See Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd on other
grounds, 682 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983); L. Loss,
FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 582-84 (1983).
175. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, on remand, 705 F.2d 775 (5th Cir.
1983).
176. Chemetron Corp. v. Business Funds, Inc., 718 F.2d 725 (5th Cir. 1983) (vacating its
previous judgment in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Herman & MacLean v.
Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983)).
177. See supra text accompanying notes 115-45. Section 9 is headed "Manipulation of
Security Prices" although, curiously, the word "manipulation" or "manipulative" does not
appear anywhere in the text of the section.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 159, 165-67.
179. A report from the legislative history of the Act states:
[Section 9(a)(2)] makes it unlawful to effect either alone or in concert with others
a series of transactions in any registered security, creating actual or apparent
active trading in the security or raising or depressing the price thereof, for the
purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of the security by others. This provision
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Because the stock market practices that were the subject of the hear-
ings occurred largely in connection with trading on the stock
exchanges, rather than on the then embryonic over-the-counter mar-
ket, the prohibitions of section 9(a) were confined to activities "in any
security registered on a national securities exchange"-that is, listed
securities. 180
Section 9(a)(1) prohibits wash sales and matched orders.'' This
"crude" form of manipulative activity, according to a 1934 committee
report, "create[s] a misleading appearance of activity with a view to
enticing the unwary into the market on the hope of a quick gain."'82
It was regarded as "the most vicious practice of the stock exchanges
... on a par with the use of loaded dice.., however, more reprehensi-
ble."'' i 3 For a violation of section 9(a)(1) to occur, the activity must
be "for the purpose of creating a false or misleading appearance of
active trading in [the] security."' 84  Because the only likely purpose
of engaging in wash sales or matched orders is to falsify the market,
however, this requirement of specific intent has not been an obstacle
to imposing liability for this kind of activity.'8 5
Sections 9(a)(3), (4), and (5) 186 are specialized prohibitions
designed to end certain identified manipulative practices of broker-
dealers and other persons selling, offering to sell, purchasing, or offer-
ing to purchase registered securities. Section 9(a)(3) prohibits such
persons from inducing the purchase or sale of a security by distribut-
ing information that the price of the security is likely to rise or fall as
a result of a manipulation, while section 9(a)(5) prohibits any other
person from doing the same thing for a consideration received from
any such person.' 8 7  Section 9(a)(4) prohibits such persons from
should perform the wholesome service of outlawing pool operations, as well as
every other device used to persuade the public that activity in a security is the
reflection of a genuine demand instead of a mirage.
S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1934). See supra text accompanying note 139.
180. Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a).
181. Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(l).
182. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1934).
183. 78 CONG. REC. 7717 (1934).
184. Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(1).
185. See Note, Manipulation of the Stock Markets Under the Securities Laws, supra note 23,
at 662; Comment, Market Manipulation and the Securities Exchange Act, supra note 23, at
638.
186. Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(a)(3)-(5).
187. It has been argued that sections 9(a)(3) and (5) do not require misrepresentation or
nondisclosure, and that therefore deception is not an essential element of manipulation of all
the antimanipulative provisions of the Act. Junewicz, supra note 34, at 1185. Although it is
* literally true that a person can violate section 9(a)(3) or (5) by making true statements (that is,
that a manipulation is planned or taking place), these two subsections are in a sense derivative
as they can be violated by truthful statements only if there is a manipulation.
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inducing the purchase or sale of a security by materially false or mis-
leading statements. These provisions of the Exchange Act were aimed
at eliminating "tipster sheets" and the like, as well as the "touting" of
listed securities.18 Like section 9(a)(1), they prohibited manipulative
abuses that were already illegal under other provisions of federal and
state law. 189
Section 9(a)(2), which has been called "the very heart of the
act,"'1 9 makes it unlawful for any person to effect "a series of transac-
tions in any [listed] security.., creating actual or apparent trading in
such security or raising or depressing [its] price. . ., for the purpose of
inducing the purchase or sale of such security by others."1 91 In order
to establish a violation of section 9(a)(2), three elements must be
shown: that a person (1) effected a series of transactions, 9 2 which (2)
created actual or apparent trading or raised or depressed the price of a
registered security, (3) for the purpose of inducing others to buy or
sell the security. 193
The legislative history of the specific-purpose requirement of sec-
tion 9(a)(2) provides a useful insight into the framers' understanding
of the term "manipulation." Because section 9(a)(2) created a new
offense unknown to the American common law, and because the line
between legitimate and manipulative trading was a thin one, Congress
was concerned that the statute clearly define the requisite intent.194 In
the version of the section that was reported out by the House of Rep-
resentatives, the requisite intent was that "of raising or depressing the
price of such security."' 95 Similarly, the Senate version required that
the trading be "with the specific intent of raising or depressing such
price."'1 96 In explaining these provisions, the legislators emphasized
188. S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1934).
189. See supra text accompanying notes 147-52, 158.
190. L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIEs REGULATION 992 (1983) (footnote
omitted).
191. Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2).
192. A "series" may be as few as three, or possibly two, transactions. 3 L. Loss,
SECURITIES REGULATION 1550 (2d ed. 1961). A bid or offer will suffice as a "transaction,"
even though no purchase or sale occurs. Note, Manipulation of the Stock Markets Under the
Securities Laws, supra note 23, at 663.
193. See Spencer Co. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,301 at
91,895 (D. Mass. Sept. 21, 1981), later op., FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,361 (D. Mass. Nov.
17, 1981), later proc., 542 F. Supp. 237 (D. Mass. 1982). The third element of section 9(a)(2),
the requisite purpose of inducing others to buy (or sell), is an essential element of the offense.
SEC v. Resch-Cassin & Co., 362 F. Supp. 964, 977 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
194. Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings on S. 84, 56, 97 Before the Senate Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6507-10 (1934) [hereinafter cited as Stock
Exchange Practices].
195. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1934).
196. S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1934).
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that extensive trading is bound to cause changes in the market price of
a security, but that mere knowledge on the part of a purchaser or
seller that his transactions will have this effect is not sufficient to make
the transactions manipulative. 197 A representative of the New York
Stock Exchange nevertheless complained that under the Senate bill
"people will not know whether they are on the verge or on the edge of
performing a criminal act.... [Because] nobody buys a security with
the idea that his purchase is going to leave the market entirely unaf-
fected," every purchase or sale might be interpreted as being for the
purpose of raising or depressing the price, "and hence every buyer
and seller would be a criminal."19
The Conference Committee that resolved the differences between
the House and Senate bills substituted the more restrictive require-
ment that the purpose be that of "inducing the purchase or sale of
such securities by others." Under the new language, it would no
longer be possible to find a person guilty of manipulative activity sim-
ply because he knows or should have known that a price movement
would be a natural consequence of his purchases or sales.' 99 Most
important for the purposes of this discussion, it is implicit in the spe-
cific intent requirement of section 9(a)(2) that deception is a necessary
element of manipulation by trading. Nondeceptive activities might
have been brought within the prohibition of the section if it merely
required that a purchaser's or seller's purpose be to raise or depress
the price of the security. But a person who purchases or sells securi-
ties for the purpose of inducing other persons to trade is necessarily
deceiving those persons into believing that the manipulator's
purchases or sales are a bona fide expression of supply and demand in
the market, rather than the creation of a "price mirage." 2°° Thus sec-
tion 9(a)(2), which made illegal a hitherto unproscribed type of mar-
ket activity, was consistent with the view that existed in 1934 and
197. Id.; H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1934). "Bringing about a price rise
... is not unlawful in itself." Op. Gen. Counsel, Sec. Ex. Act Rel. No. 3056 (1941).
198. Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 194, at 6508, 6510.
199. In the context of criminal law, specific intent requires that the doer of an act intend a
consequence that "represent[s] the very purpose for which an act is done (regardless of
likelihood or occurrence), or ... [that is] known to be substantially certain to result (regard
less of desire)." R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE 417 (5th ed. 1977) (footnote omitted). Similarly, in tort law, the word "intent"
means "that the actor desires to cause the consequences of his act, or that he believes that the
consequences are substantially certain to result from it." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 8A (1965). See Comment, Market Manipulation and the Securities Exchange Act, supra note
23, at 634.
200. See United States v. Brown, 5 F. Supp. 81, 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), aff'd, 79 F.2d 321 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 650 (1935); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480
F.2d 341, 383 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973), reh'g denied, 430 U.S. 976 (1976).
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earlier, that manipulation was a form of deception.2°'
In order to establish the requisite purpose of section 9(a)(2) of
inducing others to purchase or sell, the courts have generally required
some additional activity by the defendants, other than a series of
transactions.2 °2 Such additional activity may include making a secret
agreement with other owners of the security to withhold their securi-
ties from the market while the defendant makes his purchases; 20 3
making secret sales off the market, while making purchases on the
market;21 or engaging in a distribution of the security in order to use
the manipulated after-market to sell the security to the public.20 5
The SEC has adopted the position that manipulation in violation
of section 9(a)(2) is an inherently deceptive practice. Thus, in Thorn-
ton & Co.,2 06 where the respondents manipulated the market for a
listed stock by both wash sales and actual trading, in violation of sec-
tions 9(a)(1) and 9(a)(2), the Commission said:
Purchasers in over-the-counter as well as the Exchange markets
are entitled to believe that the Exchange market price which gov-
erned the price charged them represents a price established in an
independent market free of artificial devices. To sell securities on
the basis of a manipulated price is to sell on the basis of
misrepresentation.2°7
B. Section 10(b)
Section 10(b), which is by far the best known and most important
of the Act's antimanipulative provisions, prohibits any person from
using "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of a security, in violation of rules
prescribed by the SEC "as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors. '20 8  Section 10(b) was
intended as a "catch-all" provision to enable the SEC "to deal with
201. "[A]II section 9 devices have the effect of misinforming investors by creating the false
impression that certain market activity is occurring when in fact such activity is unrelated to
actual supply and demand." Hundahl v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1349, 1361
(N.D. Tex. 1979). See supra text accompanying notes 115-45. For further discussion of the
Hundahl case, see also infra text accompanying notes 231-41.
202. Liberty Nat'l Ins. Holding Co. v. Charter Co., FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) t 98,671
(N.D. Ala. Apr. 27, 1982), later op., FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,797 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 13,
1982), aff'd, 734 F.2d 545 (1 1th Cir. 1984).
203. Otis & Co. v. SEC, 106 F.2d 579 (6th Cir. 1939).
204. Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 794-97 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970).
205. SEC v. Resch-Cassin & Co., Inc., 362 F. Supp. 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
206. 28 S.E.C. 208 (1948), aff'd, 171 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1948).
207. Id. at 224 (citing Kidder, Peabody, & Co., 18 S.E.C. 559 (1945)) (emphasis added).
208. For the complete text of section 10(b), see supra note 20.
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new manipulative devices" that did not exist or were not known in
1934.09 Because it was not possible to foresee every manipulative
device that might be invented in the future, Congress gave the SEC
authority under section 10(b) to adopt rules defining additional
manipulative practices.21°
Section 10(b) is not self-operative but requires that the SEC
adopt rules to implement it. As the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
has stated:
Section 10(b) does not flatly prohibit the use of a manipulative
device in the purchase or sale of a security; rather, it prohibits "any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention
of such rules as the [SEC] may prescribe." Only those manipula-
tive devices prohibited in SEC Regulations are unlawful under the
Exchange Act.21'
Several of the rules that the Commission has adopted under sec-
tion 10(b) do actually define specific practices as being manipula-
tive.212 Most of the discussion of the antimanipulative content of
section 10(b) centers on Rule lOb-5, however, which the Commission
adopted in 1942.13 This rule simply applies, with little change in lan-
guage, the broad antifraud provisions of section 17(a) of the Securities
Act of 1933214 to purchases as well as sales of securities.2 1 5 Because
section 10(b) is applicable to "any security," while section 9(a)
applies only to securities registered on a national securities
exchange,216 Rule lOb-5 has been used to proscribe manipulation of
an unlisted security that would be a violation of section 9(a) if the
209. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203 (1976). See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green,
430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977); see also Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 801 (5th Cir. 1970).
210. Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 "are not intended as a specification of particular acts or
practices that constitute 'manipulative or deceptive devices or contrivances,' but are instead
designed to encompass the infinite variety of devices that are alien to the 'climate of fair
dealing.'" Herpich, 430 F.2d at 802 (citing SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S.
180 (1963)).
211. Marsh v. Armada Corp., 533 F.2d 978, 982 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954
(1977).
212. For example, SEC Rule 1Ob-6 prohibits participants in a distribution of securities from
engaging in certain market activities. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6 (1983). See L. Loss,
FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 802-03 (1983).
213. For the complete text of Rule lOb-5, see supra note 20.
214. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) [hereinafter cited as Securities Act]. The
Commission adopted Rule lOb-5 to close a loophole: to afford sellers the same protection that
buyers have under section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933. The rule's aim is to reach
"misleading or deceptive activities, whether or not they are precisely and technically sufficient
to sustain a common law action for fraud and deceit." Herpich, 430 F.2d at 802 (quoting
Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961)).
215. See L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 820-22 (1983).
216. See supra text accompanying note 180.
[Vol. 40:671
STOCK MARKET MANIPULATION
security were a listed security.2 1 7 That limited though important
application of the rule leaves open, however, the central question for
this discussion: what are the meaning and scope of the term "manip-
ulation" under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5?
It seems clear that, because section 10(b) was designed as a
"catch-all" that would encompass "new" types of manipulation,2" 8 its
prohibitions are not limited to the specific practices described in sec-
tion 9(a).219 There is no evidence that Congress's only purpose in
enacting section 10(b) was to apply the prohibitions of section 9(a) to
over-the-counter securities, or to apply the prohibitions of section
17(a) to fraudulent purchases.220 At the same time, the question
remains: if manipulation under section 10(b) is a broader concept
than it is under section 9(a), how much broader is it?221
As stated earlier, the Supreme Court in Santa Fe, a case brought
under section 10(b), said that manipulation "refers generally to prac-
tices, such as wash sales, matched orders, or rigged prices, that are
intended to mislead investors by artificially affecting market activ-
ity." '22 2 This definition is restrictive in two ways. First, it defines
manipulation in terms of the specific practices prohibited by section
9(a), although it stops short of saying that its scope is limited to those
practices. Second, the Santa Fe Court's use of the word "mislead" in
the final clause of its definition indicates that the Court considered
deception to be an essential element of manipulation.223 With the
217. Barrett & Co., 9 S.E.C. 310 (1941). Because section 17(a) of the Securities Act applies
only to sales of securities, and section 15(c) of the Exchange Act, while applying to purchases
as well as sales, is limited to fraudulent acts by brokers and dealers, Rule lOb-5 has also been
used against nonbrokers or dealers who engage in fraudulent purchases. See L. Loss,
FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 820-22 (1983).
218. L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 821 (1983).
219. But see Hundahl v. United Benefit Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1349, 1361 (N.D. Tex. 1979)
(where the court said in dictum: "Legislative history supports the . . . view that the
manipulative conduct prohibited in Section 10(b) is limited to the devices which Section 9
bars.").
220. "[Congress] did not ...limit the section in its application to the manipulative and
deceptive devices or contrivances known in 1934." Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 801 (5th
Cir. 1970).
221. For a discussion of manipulative activities prohibited by section 9(a), see supra text
accompanying notes 177-207.
222. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 476. See supra text accompanying note 61.
223. Section 10(b)'s general prohibition of practices deemed by the SEC to be
"manipulative"-in this technical sense of artificially affecting market activity in
order to mislead investors-is fully consistent with the fundamental purpose of
the 1934 " 'Act to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of
caveat emptor.' "
Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 476-77 (quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128,
151 (1972) and SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)).
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notable exception of Mobil Corp v. Marathon Oil Co., 2 2 4 almost all the
court decisions dealing with corporate control transactions have fol-
lowed the teaching of Santa Fe that manipulation under section 10(b),
although not limited to the section 9(a) prohibitions, is limited to
these and similar practices that deceive investors. As Judge Lasker
has stated:
This term of art cannot be extended to cover every form of unfair
dealing which appears to the lay person to be manipulative. The
unifying element in the manipulative devices listed in Santa Fe is
that they are "used to persuade the public that activity in a security
is the reflection of genuine demand instead of a mirage.,
225
In United States v. Charnay,226 a case decided shortly before
Santa Fe, an indictment charged that the defendants, who had made
an offer to acquire all the assets of Air West on behalf of Hughes Tool
Company, artificially depressed the price of the stock on the Ameri-
can Stock Exchange in order to coerce the company's directors to
vote in favor of the offer. According to the indictment, this was done
by causing several persons to make substantial sales of Air West stock
and at the same time guaranteeing to these sellers by secret under-
standing a recovery of a minimum amount irrespective of the price
obtained on the Exchange.2 2 7 The trial court dismissed the indict-
ment because it did not include an allegation that the defendants' pur-
pose was to induce the purchase or sale of the stock by others. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that there is simply
no requirement under Rule lOb-5, as there is under section 9(a)(2),
that such a purpose be alleged or proved.22 8 It is enough, the court
said, that the defendants "purposely sought to depress the market for
the stock, and in fact achieved this result, with the object and effect of
deceiving the shareholders and directors. ' 229 Thus the court held
that a charge of manipulation by trading under section 10(b) requires
that there be deception and an intent to influence the market price of
a security, but not necessarily the specific intent required by section
9(a)(2). 23°
On the other hand, in Hundahl v. United Benefit Life Insurance
224. 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981). See supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
225. Billard v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 526 F. Supp. 218, 222 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 683 F.2d 51
(2d Cir. 1981) (citation omitted).
226. 537 F.2d 341 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976), aff'd, 577 F.2d 81 (9th Cir.
1978). For further discussion of this case, see infra text accompanying notes 357-58.
227. Id. at 344.
228. See supra text accompanying notes 190-205.
229. Charnay, 537 F.2d at 350.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 190-205.
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Co.,2 1 where the defendants were charged with artificially depressing
a stock by means of nondisclosures and misrepresentations, Judge
Higginbotham of the Northern District of Texas took a far narrower
view of what constitutes manipulation under section 10(b). In that
case, Mutual, which owned seventy-one percent of the shares of
United, had made an offer to buy the nine percent of the outstanding
shares that were owned by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs claimed that,
in order to induce them to sell their shares, Mutual had artificially
depressed the price of United shares through use of misleading and
grossly conservative accounting reports, improper restriction of divi-
dends, and failure to disclose their actions and the true value of
United's assets. These acts, the plaintiffs claimed, were manipulative
under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.23 2
Judge Higginbotham dismissed the suit. He held that "conduct
that interferes with the free market only by depriving it of complete
information is not necessarily manipulative." '233 Judge Higginbotham
defined manipulation as "practices in the marketplace which have the
effect of either creating the false impression that certain market activ-
ity is occurring when in fact such activity is unrelated to actual supply
and demand or tampering with the price itself." '234 In the court's
view, the scope of manipulation under section 10(b) is closely related
to the "section 9 devices," all of which "have the effect of misinform-
ing investors by creating the false impression that certain market
activity is occurring when in fact such activity is unrelated to actual
supply and demand. '235 While Judge Higginbotham stopped short of
holding that manipulation under section 10(b) is limited to the section
9(a) prohibitions, he stated that such a view is suggested by the legis-
lative history of the Exchange Act.2 36
The Hundahl definition seems to limit manipulation to falsifica-
tion of the market and to exclude from the definition false statements
about a company or its securities that are designed to affect the mar-
ket's valuation of the securities. In Hundahl, the plaintiff argued that
section 9(a)(4), which makes it unlawful to make any intentionally
false or misleading statement for the purpose of inducing the purchase
or sale of a security, seems to prohibit exactly the type of conduct
231. 465 F. Supp. 1349 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
232. Id. at 1354.
233. Id. at 1360.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 1361.
236. Id. See also In re Commonwealth Oil/Tesoro Petroleum Sec. Litig., 484 F. Supp.
253, 267 (W.D. Tex. 1979) (Higginbotham, J.).
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alleged in that case.237 The court rejected this contention, saying that
section 9(a)(4) applies only to persons "intimately involved in the
workings of the marketplace-brokers, dealers, and persons who sell,
buy, or offer to sell or buy a security registered on a national
exchange. "238
The Hundahl definition of manipulation seems unduly narrow,
and it has not generally been followed by other courts. It is difficult to
understand why persons who make false statements about a company
for the purpose of buying up the company's shares at a depressed
price, as the defendants in Hundahl were alleged to have done, should
not be considered to be "in the marketplace." In fact, there seems to
be no reason why manipulation under section 10(b) should not
include the making of false statements about a stock for the purpose
of increasing its market value by a person who has pledged shares of
the stock as collateral for a loan. Actions of this kind would not vio-
late section 9(a)(4) because the actor is not himself purchasing or
offering to purchase the security, but they would have the elements of
deception and manipulative intent required for a section 10(b)
violation.239
Furthermore, the language of section 10(b), which covers decep-
tive or manipulative conduct by "any person," seems to argue against
Judge Higginbotham's restriction of the definition to persons inti-
mately involved with the market place. 2 °
It can be seen from Charnay and Hundahl that the courts have
237. Hundahl, 465 F. Supp. at 1361 n.5. The entire text of section 9(a)(4) is as follows:
(a) Transactions relating to purchase or sale of security
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of the
mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange, or for any member of a national securities
exchange-
(4) If a dealer or broker, or other person selling or offering for sale or
purchasing or offering to purchase the security, to make, regarding any security
registered on a national securities exchange, for the purpose of inducing the
purchase or sale of such security, any statement which was at the time and in the
light of the circumstances under which it was made, false or misleading with
respect to any material fact, and Which he knew or had reasonable ground to
believe was so false or misleading.
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(4).
238. Hundahl, 465 F. Supp. at 1361.
239. False or misleading statements made in order to "affect the market price of a
company's stock to the advantage of the company or its insiders" violate section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5 even though the person who makes the statements does not purchase or sell any
securities. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, 401 F.2d 833, 861-63 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nor. Coates v.
SEC and Kline v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
240. It is also significant that persons other than brokers and dealers, such as corporate
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not been entirely consistent in defining the scope of manipulation
under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. Nevertheless, these cases are
consistent with the teaching of Santa Fe (and of Schreiber) that
manipulation under section 10(b) is closely restricted by the common
law concept of manipulation as an inherently deceptive practice aimed
at falsely affecting the public's valuation of a security.24 1
C. The Williams Act
The Williams Act242 is designed to regulate tender offers and cor-
porate repurchases of stock.243 It contains two antimanipulative pro-
visions: section 13(e), 2 " which gives the SEC authority to regulate
"acts and practices [which] are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipula-
tive" in connection with corporate repurchases by issuers that are reg-
istered with the Commission under the Exchange Act; and section
14(e),245 which prohibits (1) any material misstatement or omission
and (2) "any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices,
in connection with any tender offer."' 246 Section 14(e) also gives the
SEC rulemaking authority.
Section 13(e) need not detain us for very long. The Commission
has used the rulemaking authority that it acquired under this section
to regulate "going private" transactions247 and tender offers by issu-
ers. 24  In the hearings on the bill that became the Williams Act, SEC
chairman Manuel Cohen stated that corporate repurchases may have
a significant effect on the market price of the shares. He referred to
situations that had occurred "in which repurchases of shares were
timed to increase the market price for such shares, while the company
was negotiating to acquire other companies in exchange for its
officers, frequently participated in pre-1934 manipulations. See supra note 125 and text
accompanying note 126.
241. "Indeed, one leading commentator has written that the Securities Exchange Act did
not modify the common law concept of manipulation, but incorporated it." Hundahl, 465 F.
Supp. at 1360 (citing 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1530 (2d ed. 1961)). See supra text
accompanying notes 146-66.
242. See supra note 27.
243. For the legislative history of the Williams Act, see generally S. REP. Nos. 510 & 550,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); H. R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
244. Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e).
245. Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e).
246. Id. For the full text of section 14(c), see supra note 14.
247. SEC Rule 13e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1985). A going private transaction is the
process of "[e]liminating public stock ownership in a corporation with the intention of
continuing the corporation's life and business as a closely held company." Kerr, Going
Private: Adopting a Corporate Purpose Standard, 3 SEC. REG. L.J. 33 (1975).
248. SEC Rule 13e-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4 (1985). See supra note 174 for definition of the
term "tender offer."
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stock. '2 49  In one of these situations, "a repurchase program was
actually used... to reduce the number of shares deliverable under
existing contracts for the acquisition of other companies, or the assets
of other companies. "2 50 While conceding that it already had "sub-
stantial authority" under section 10(b) to deal with such activities, the
Commission stated that under section 13(e) it would be able to adopt
"more specific rules designed to deal with a variety of problems aris-
ing out of corporations' repurchases of their own shares" and "to mit-
igate undesirable market impact" caused by such activities. 25'
Apart from its discussion of these corporate repurchase situa-
tions, the legislative history of the Williams Act offers no guidance as
to what the lawmakers meant by the term "manipulative" either in
section 13(e)2 52 or 14(e), 253 or whether the term "manipulative" has a
different meaning under the Williams Act than it has under section
10(b). As the Schreiber Court states, the legislative history of section
249. Full Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership and in Corporate Takeover Bids:
Hearings on S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1967) [hereinafter referred to as Hearings]. See Complaint
in SEC v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 91,680 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 1966);
Genesco, Inc., 1966 Prospectus (May 10, 1966).
250. Hearings, supra note 249, at 27.
251. Id. at 212, 213 app. 1.
252. In Schreiber, the Court stated that section 13(e) was enacted as a result of
congressional concern "that corporate stock repurchases could be used to distort the market
for corporate control." 105 S. Ct. at 2463 n.8. The Court did not, however, cite any authority
for this statement.
253. Several points about the two antimanipulative provisions of the Williams Act may be
noted. First, unlike section 10(b), both sections 13(e) and 14(e) proscribe "fraudulent" as well
as "deceptive" and "manipulative" conduct. The SEC at one time took the position that the
additional word in the statute gave it authority to regulate the fairness of corporate repurchase
Programs. Proposed Rule 13e-3A required a good faith belief in the fairness of the terms
supported by the informed opinions of two outside experts, while proposed Rule 13e-3B
required both fairness of terms and a valid business purpose. Sec. Ex. Act Rel. No. 5567, Feb.
6, 1975, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,104. The agency, however, has never attempted to
regulate the fairness of transactions covered by section 13(e). See SEC Rule 13e-3, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.13e-3 (1985). As indicated earlier, Schreiber now makes it clear that the Williams Act
does not govern the fairness of transactions. See supra text accompanying notes 75-76.
Second, section 13(e), like section 10(b) but unlike section 14(e), is not operative unless the
SEC exercises its rulemaking authority under the section. Third, section 13(e), applies only to
companies with securities registered under the Exchange Act, whereas section 14(e) applies to
"any tender offer," regardless of whether the target company has a class of registered
securities, and section 10(b) applies to "any security," whether or not registered on a national
exchange. Section 14(e), therefore, unlike the other provisions of the Williams Act, applies to
a tender offer for shares of a company that is not required to register with the SEC. L.P.
Acquisition Co. v. Tyson, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,271 at 91,878 (6th Cir. Aug. 26,
1985).
Finally, under sections 13(e) and 14(e) the Commission has authority to adopt rules both
to define and to "prescribe means designed reasonably to prevent" the proscribed acts; whereas
under section 10(b) the Commission has authority to adopt "such rules and regulations as [it]
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14(e) is "sparse. ' 254 The few references that are made to the section
in the congressional reports speak only of its role in requiring that
investors receive "full disclosure of material information" from per-
sons making or opposing tender offers.255 Nowhere in the legislative
history is there any discussion of the term "manipulative" or any sug-
gestion that the term might mean something else under section 14(e)
than it does under section 10(b).
Practically from the time the Williams Act became effective, the
courts have seen no essential difference between the substance of sec-
tions 14(e) and 10(b), the principal difference between the two sec-
tions being their respective "in connection with" clauses.256 For
example, in Panter v. Marshall Field & Co.,257 the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals held that sections 14(e) and 10(b) "are coextensive
in their antifraud prohibitions, and differ only in their 'in connection
with' language. They are therefore construed in pari materia by
courts."25 Similarly, in Golub v. PPD Corp.,2 59 the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that "Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 and § 14(a)
"may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors." Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
The legislative history of the Williams Act does not indicate any reason for the differences
between section 13(e) and 14(e), or for the differences between these sections and section 10(b).
254. Schreiber, 105 S. Ct. at 2464. Similarly, "the legislative history of § 10(b) is sparse and
there is a 'dearth of evidence' as to the intent of Congress." Poser, Misuse of Confidential
Information Concerning a Tender Offer as a Securities Fraud, 49 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1265, 1278
(1983) (citing 1 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD § 2.2 (330), at 22.2 (Supp. 1977)).
255. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1968); S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. 11 (1967).
256. Section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 proscribe manipulative conduct in connection with the
"purchase or sale of any security," whereas section 14(e) proscribes manipulative conduct in
connection with "any tender offer." The principal effect of this language difference is that a
nonpurchaser or seller has standing to sue under section 14(e) but not under section 10(b). See
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731-32, 737-38 (1975); Stull v. Bayard,
561 F.2d 429, 432 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978); Pryor v. United States
Steel Corp., 591 F. Supp. 942, 954 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). The fact that an early decision, that of
Judge Weinfeld in Applied Digital Data Sys. v. Milgo Elec., 425 F. Supp. 1145 (S.D.N.Y.
1977), interpreted section 14 (e) broadly, so as to include actions which under principles of
common law tort would constitute unlawful interference with a prospective advantage,
actually supports the argument that sections 10(b) and 14(e) are substantively identical,
because Milgo was decided before the Supreme Court had handed down its narrow
interpretation of section 10(b) in Santa Fe. Judge Weinfeld stated that "14(e) in effect applies
Rule lOb-5 to a tender offeror and parties opposing a tender offer." Id. at 1153 n.21 (citing
Electronic Specialty Co. v. Int'l Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 940-41 (2d Cir. 1969). The
Court consequently interpreted section 14(e) consistently with the Second Circuit's holding in
Green v. Santa Fe Indus. Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1286-87 (2d Cir. 1976) (which the Supreme
Court was later to reverse), that section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 prohibited breaches of fiduciary
duty by corporate management).
257. 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
258. Id. at 282 (citations omitted).
259. 576 F.2d 759 (8th Cir. 1978).
1986]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:671
and (e) and Rule 14a-9 are obviously aimed at the same general evils
in the field of corporate ownership, management and finance, are in
pari materia and should be similarly construed. '26° Even the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals, which until the time of the Supreme Court's
Schreiber decision was the only federal appeals court that had held
that nondeceptive acts could come within section 14(e)'s prohibition
of "manipulative acts or practices," did not draw a distinction
between sections 10(b) and 14(e); its decision in Mobil Corp v. Mara-
thon Oil Co. 2 6 1 was based both on an expansive reading of the term
"manipulative" and on a finding that that reading was not inconsis-
tent with the Supreme Court's interpretation of section 10(b) in
Hochfelder and Santa Fe.2 6 2
If there were ever any legitimate doubts in the past that the oper-
ative language of section 14(e) should be interpreted in the same man-
ner as section 10(b), the Schreiber decision has now put those doubts
to rest. Neither the differences in the language of the two sections nor
the different contexts in which they appear in the statute justifies, in
the Supreme Court's eyes, any difference in interpretation. In fact,
the Court based its decision squarely on Santa Fe, stating that "Con-
gress used the phrase 'manipulative or deceptive' in section 10(b) as
well [as in section 14(e)], and we have interpreted 'manipulative' in
that context to require misrepresentation. 2 63 As to the use by Con-
gress in section 14(e) but not in section 10(b) of the word "fraudu-
lent," the Court said: "All three species of misconduct, i.e.,
'fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative,' listed by Congress are
directed at failures to disclose. ' '26 Thus the numerous decisions that
260. Id. at 764. In Lewis v. McGraw, 495 F. Supp. 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 619 F.2d 192
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 951 (1980), the district court said: "The principles of Santa Fe
Industries apply to claims under Section 14(e) as well as Section 10(b)." Id. at 31 (citations
omitted).
261. 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982).
262. To support its holding that there was manipulation, the Sixth Circuit cited the
Supreme Court's statement in Santa Fe: " 'No doubt Congress meant to prohibit the full range
of ingenious devices that might be used to manipulate securities prices.' " Mobil Oil, 669 F.2d
at 374 (quoting 430 U.S. at 477). The court also cited the qualifying language used in Santa
Fe, in order to make the point that the Supreme Court had not said "that nondisclosure was
the only ground upon which to base a 10(b) claim." Id. at 376, citing Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at
477-78. The point is that the Sixth Circuit did not attempt to distinguish Santa Fe on the
grounds that that case was brought under a different section of the Exchange Act than was
Mobil. See supra text accompanying notes 32-33, 60-61.
263. Schreiber, 105 S. Ct. at 2462 (citing Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 476-77; Piper, 430 U.S. at 43;
and Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 199).
264. Id. Sections 13(e) and 14(e) were not the first provisions of the Exchange Act to
prohibit "fraudulent" acts. Sections 15(c)(1) and 15(c)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(l)-(2), which
were adopted in 1936, prohibit fraudulent, as well as deceptive and manipulative, conduct by
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discuss the meaning of "manipulation" under section 10(b)2 6 5 are
equally applicable to situations involving section 14(e). 266
V. DECEPTION AND INTENT AS ELEMENTS OF MANIPULATION
The two principal legal issues concerning manipulation are those
of deception and intent. As we have seen in the discussion of section
9(a)(2) and its legislative history, the two issues are closely interre-
lated.2 67  The Schreiber decision makes it clear that manipulation
requires deception, but it does not deal with the nature of the decep-
tion that is required. Furthermore, there is ample precedent that
manipulation under section 10(b) or 14(e) requires at least an intent to
influence the price of a security. 268 The requisite manipulative intent
under these sections of the Exchange Act is more specific than the
scienter that is required for "deceptive" conduct under section
10(b) 269 but perhaps less specific than the requirements of section
9(a).270
The purpose of this part of the Article is to explore further the
issues of deception and intent, in the context of asserted manipulation
in connection with corporate control transactions.
A. Deception
1. DISTINCTION BETWEEN "DECEPTIVE" AND
"MANIPULATIVE" CONDUCT
A question that needs to be asked is why the definition of
"manipulative" matters, now that Schreiber has established beyond
any doubt that misrepresentation or nondisclosure is an essential ele-
ment of manipulative conduct under section 14(e) and, by extension,
under section 10(b). Because sections 10(b) and 14(e) prohibit decep-
tive as well as manipulative conduct, what does alleging manipulation
add to a plaintiff's claim?271
brokers and dealers in dealings in the over-the-counter market. L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF
SECURITIES REGULATION 803 (1983).
265. See supra text accompanying notes 222-36.
266. See supra text accompanying notes 256-62.
267. See supra text accompanying notes 194-201.
268. See Atchley v. Qonaar Corp., 704 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1983). In Chris-Craft Indus. v.
Piper Aircraft Corp., the court said: "So long as the investor's motive ... is not to create an
artificial demand for, or supply of, the security, illegal market manipulation is not established."
480 F.2d 341, 383 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973), reh'g denied, 430 U.S. 976
(1976).
269. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
270. See United States v. Charnay, 537 F.2d 341 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 100
(1976), aff'd, 577 F.2d 81 (9th Cir. 1978).
271. An argument some commentators made before the Schreiber decision was that, if
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Indeed, in many situations, particularly where the allegedly
improper conduct consists of false or misleading statements or omis-
sions, an allegation of deception will suffice and alleging manipulation
does not add anything to the plaintiff's claim. If the plaintiff is, how-
ever, unable to prove that he actually relied on the defendant's decep-
tion, the question of whether there was manipulation may be
important. In a manipulation case based on misleading misstatements
or omissions, the causal link between the defendant's misconduct and
the plaintiff's harm is provided by the manipulation's effect on the
market.272 In a deception case based on the defendant's affirmative
misstatements, on the other hand, reliance must be pleaded and
proved in some jurisdictions, although not in jurisdictions that have
adopted the "fraud on the market" theory: namely, that the plaintiff
relied on the integrity of the market to reflect the free interplay of
supply and demand, and that the defendant's misstatements interfered
with the integrity of the market.273 In a deception case based on
omissions of material facts by the defendant, however, the plaintiff
need not prove actual reliance if he can show that the omissions were
material.274
It may be seen that the "fraud on the market" theory is the first
cousin, or possibly an even closer relative, of manipulation.275 Under
both concepts, the causal line between the plaintiff's harm and the
deception were a necessary element of manipulation, the term "manipulation" in the statute
would be surplusage. The Supreme Court refuted this argument in Schreiber. See supra text
accompanying notes 64-66.
272. "[W]here the success of a fraud does not require an exercise of volition by the plaintiff,
but instead requires an exercise of volition by other persons, there need be no showing that the
plaintiff himself relied upon the deception. 'What must be shown is that there was deception
which misled [other] stockholders and that this was in fact the cause of plaintiff's claimed
injury.'" Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 797 (2d Cir. 1969) (citing
Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 635 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970
(1968)).
273. Traditionally, a plaintiff in a private action under Rule lOb-5 must demonstrate actual
reliance on the defendant's deception. The "fraud on the market" theory does away with this
requirement. Although the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the theory, the Second,
Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have accepted it in some form. See, e.g., Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d
365 (2d Cir. 1981), vacated as moot, 459 U.S. 1027 (1982); Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462 (5th
Cir. 1981) (en banc); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975),.cert. denied, 429 U.S.
816 (1976). These courts recognize the difficulty of proving reliance "where the fraud has
affected the market and damaged the plaintiff only through its effect on the market. ...
[Therefore, they] do not require direct reliance where the fraud affects the market, on the
ground that an investor relies generally on the supposition that the market price is validly set
and that no unsuspected fraud has affected the price." Panzirer, 663 F.2d at 368.
274. Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972). For the Supreme
Court's definition of materiality, see TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449
(1976).
275. See supra text accompanying notes 151-52.
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defendant's wrongdoing is not actual reliance on the defendant's
deceptive acts, but damage to the free market. The "fraud on the
market" theory, however, has a number of drawbacks. First, it is still
an emerging concept that has not been accepted by some federal cir-
cuit courts of appeal, and the Supreme Court has yet to rule on its
validity.27 6 Second, the theory established only a presumption of reli-
ance, which may be rebutted by showing that the material misrepre-
sentation or omission did not substantially contribute to the plaintiff's
investment decision.277 Finally, the "fraud on the market" theory has
been said to apply only to securities which have "efficient" markets,
i.e., those in which "security prices reflect all available public infor-
mation about the economy, about financial markets, and about the
specific company involved." '278 For these reasons, it may be prudent
or even necessary for a plaintiff to plead manipulation, in situations
where he may have difficulty proving that he relied on the defendant's
misrepresentations that affected the market, rather than only to plead
deception, with its traditional reliance requirement.279
2. DECEPTION AND COERCION
Although a manipulated market is an "artificial" market, the
artificiality must come about as a result of deceptive conduct. For
example, the very making of a tender offer is not manipulative,
although it may create an artificial market, in the sense that the forces
of supply and demand cease operating in their normal manner.
In Billard v. Rockwell International Corp.,280 Rockwell made a
tender offer for the stock of a subsidiary at a price of $25 per share.
The plaintiffs, shareholders of the subsidiary, claimed that the offer
276. See Note, The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1143 (1982).
277. Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365, 367 (2d Cir. 1981), vacated as moot, 459 U.S. 1027
(1982); Reingold v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,880 at 90,380-81
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 1984).
278. Reingold, at 90,381. See H. KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE:
REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE 100-05 (1979); Fischel, Use of Modern Finance
Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38 Bus. LAW 1 (1982).
279. It may be argued that any plaintiff who uses the "fraud on the market" theory in a
deception case under section 10(b) or 14(e) is really alleging manipulation and should prove all
the elements of a manipulation cause of action, including specific intent to affect the price of
the security. This, however, would place an unreasonable burden on a plaintiff who purchased
in a market affected by deceptive conduct but who is unable to prove that the defendant acted
with manipulative intent. See infra text accompanying notes 280-304. For example, in
Panzirer v. Wolf, the plaintiff alleged that she purchased shares in reliance on the integrity of
the market, which had been affected by an allegedly false annual report issued by the company.
663 F.2d 365. The court held that her complaint stated a cause of action, even though it
contained no allegation that the officers or the auditors of the company acted with
manipulative intent. Id. at 367.
280. FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,733 (2d Cir. June 30, 1982).
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was manipulative under sections 10(b) and 14(e) in that Rockwell had
withheld favorable financial data concerning its subsidiary until after
the tender offer had been announced, in order to artificially depress
the price of its stock. The plaintiffs also asserted that the tender offer
"capped" the market at $25, because Rockwell had announced its
intention to follow the tender offer with a merger, under which any
non-tendering shareholders would receive the same price of $25 for
their shares.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that these allegations
did not state a cause of action for manipulation. The court empha-
sized the absence of any deception, saying, "Announcement of a genu-
ine tender offer in no way created an artificial impact on market
activity. No potential trader is led to believe there is a ready market
for shares when none in fact exists and the activity of the offeror is not
designed to achieve anything other than the success of the offer." '281
As to the withholding of financial data, the court said that this infor-
mation had been disclosed before the earliest date upon which the
shareholders could tender their shares under the terms of the tender
offer. Moreover, the offer was open for a period of forty days after the
disclosure, during which time, under the express terms of the offer,
the shareholders were free to withdraw any tendered shares.28 2 Thus,
any "freeze" on the stock price was due to the voluntary informed
judgment of the shareholders in deciding to tender their shares at the
tender offer price of $25.
Another interesting challenge to a tender offer occurred in Radol
v. Thomas,213 a case that arose out of the same contest for control as
in Mobil.284 U.S. Steel Company ("Steel") made a "two-tier merger"
bid for control of Marathon Oil Co. ("Marathon"). The first step was
an all-cash tender offer for thirty million Marathon shares at a price
of $125 per share; while the second step was a merger of Marathon
with a wholly owned subsidiary of Steel, under which each outstand-
ing Marathon share that had not been purchased under the tender
offer would be exchanged for a twelve and one-half percent twelve-
year $100 face-value note of Steel, which was deemed to be worth $86
at the time of the merger.285
281. Id. at 93,701.
282. Id. at 93,700.
283. 556 F. Supp. 586 (S.D. Ohio 1983), aff'd, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,289 (6th Cir.
Sept. 13, 1985). See also Radol v. Thomas, 534 F. Supp. 1302 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (denying
plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the proposed merger).
284. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Corp., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 982 (1982).
285. Radol, 556 F. Supp. at 588.
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The plaintiffs, Marathon shareholders, contended that the effect
of the disparity in value between the two steps of the acquisition was
to coerce the shareholders into tendering their shares in the first
step.28 6 The plaintiffs characterized this coercion as a manipulative
device within the meaning of sections 10(b) and 14(e) because it
"effectively depriv[ed] Marathon shareholders of the option of hold-
ing their shares for long-term appreciation and . . . contribute[d] to
'inefficiency in investment decisions.' "287 The plaintiffs relied on the
Sixth Circuit's Mobil decision as the basis for their claim of manipu-
lation.28 s
The district court held that Mobil did not control. "The two-tier
tender offer and merger at issue here did not 'circumvent the natural
forces of market demand' in the manner of the options in Mobil....
[T]he Court is aware of no case in which.., a disparity [between the
price of the two steps of an acquisition] has been the basis for finding
of a violation of § 10(b) or § 14(e)."' 289 Furthermore, unlike the lock-
up option that was held to be manipulative in Mobil, the two-tier offer
did not discourage competing offers; this was made clear by the fact
that the Mobil Corporation responded with a similar offer of its own.
Also, the court in Mobil allowed the two-tier arrangement to stand
when it struck down the options that Marathon had granted to Steel.
Finally, the court buttressed its conclusion that Santa Fe's "term of
art" definition of "manipulation" did not cover a two-tier acquisition,
with the fact that Congress did not outlaw transactions of this kind
but instead authorized the SEC to regulate them.29°
The distinction between deception and coercion is also made
clear in cases involving "greenmail." 2 9' The greenmail decisions per-
286. Id. at 589-90. In fact, 91.18% of the shares were tendered. See Radol v. Thomas, 534
F. Supp. 1302, 1305 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
287. Radol, 556 F. Supp. at 590.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id. See SEC Rule 13e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1985). See also Martin Marietta
Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623 (D. Md. 1982) (where the district court held that a
"front-end-loaded" two-tiered acquisition-one in which the first step of the acquisition
offered more favorable terms to shareholders than the second step-was not manipulative, in
violation of section 14(e)). Bendix had challenged Martin Marietta's two-tier offer under the
statute, on the grounds of its allegedly coercive nature, in that it placed pressure on
shareholders to tender their stock under the terms of the first step. The court said that even if
this fully disclosed two-tier acquisition "is in fact 'coercive,' it would only be because its two-
tier structure is revealed all too well." Martin Marietta, 549 F. Supp. at 630.
291. See Heine v. The Signal Cos., FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,898 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4,
1977). The SEC has studied the effects of "greenmail":
Since January, 1979 about five and one-half billion dollars has been paid by firms
to repurchase blocks of common stock from individual shareholders (or to a
particular group of shareholders). These payments represent an aggregate
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haps demonstrate more clearly than any others that coercive or even
extortionate practices are not the concern of the federal securities
laws, if unaccompanied by deception. In Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn,92
Icahn ("Icahn") and companies which he controlled, acquired more
than five percent ownership of the common stock of Dan River. In its
statement of beneficial ownership filed with the SEC under section
13(d), Icahn stated that it intended to gain control of the company
and then to merge it with another already controlled company or to
sell Dan River's assets so as to generate cash for additional business
combinations. Icahn also stated that, "given an acceptable offer, it
would be willing to abandon the takeover plans and sell its Dan River
shares." 293
Dan River alleged that this "'buy-me-out-or-face-a-takeover'
ultimatum is a manipulative and deceptive scheme."2 94 In holding in
favor of the defendant, the court stated that the plaintiff's threatened
actions did not amount to "intentional or willful conduct designed to
deceive or defraud investors by artificially affecting the price of securi-
ties," the definition of manipulation set forth in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder.29  Conceding that Icahn had presented management
with a difficult choice, the court observed that so does any party who
contemplates a takeover attempt. "Were Icahn's conduct to be held
unlawful, we would be left with the peculiar result that the tender
offeror who openly informs the investment community that a buy-out
is a distinct possibility is damned while the tender offeror who con-
ceals the same information proceeds unimpugned. ' '296 By analogy,
premium above market price of over one billion dollars. Many of these large
premium payments clearly were made by target management to reduce the threat
of losing control of the firm through a tender offer or proxy fight .... The term
'Greenmail' is commonly used to describe these payoffs, reflecting the widespread
perception that this practice, or the process leading to it, is counter to the best
interests of target shareholders.
The Impact of Targeted Share Repurchases (Greenmail) on Stock Prices, Study by the Office of
the Chief Economist of the Securities and Exchange Commission, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
83,713 at 87,173-74 (Sept. 11, 1984) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited as Impact of Green-
mail]; see also Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984) (court constru-
ing the business judgment rule in diversity case held it unlawful for directors to try to defeat
takeover attempt by voting shares they controlled); Note, Greenmail: Targeted Stock Repur-
chases and the Management-Entrenchment Hypothesis, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1054, 1060
(1985) (arguing that although evidence indicates that greenmail harms shareholders, a plaintiff
will not succeed under federal securities laws unless he can prove that the target's directors
either misrepresented the company's situation or failed to disclose material information).
292. 701 F.2d 278 (4th Cir. 1983).
293. Id. at 281.
294. Id. at 282.
295. Id. at 285 (citing Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976)). See supra text accompanying
notes 58-59.
296. Hochfelder, 701 F.2d at 285.
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the coercive frankness of the highwayman who gives his victim the
choice of "your money or your life" could not be considered fraudu-
lent. Greenmail, although it has been widely criticized, does not vio-
late section 10(b) or 14(e).2 97
Other attempts to gain control of a company by means of sub-
stantial purchases of its stock have been held nonmanipulative. For
example, in Spencer Cos. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc.,298 a target com-
pany claimed that the defendant manipulated its stock, in violation of
section 9(a)(2), by buying 36.2% of the outstanding shares. The dis-
trict court held that the complaint did not make out a violation of the
statute because there was no allegation that the defendant's purpose
was to induce others to buy.299 The plaintiff did allege, however, that
the defendant's purpose was to induce the plaintiff to buy the stock
held by the defendants at the higher market price. The court said that
allegation did not state a cause of action under section 9(a)(2) because
the plaintiff
would [not] in any way be deceived into buying the stock because
of the high market price or apparent demand for the stock.
Instead, plaintiff alleges that defendants' plan [is] to 'extort' it to
purchase the shares.... Such a purpose is not what § 9(a)(2) seeks
to prohibit. Plaintiff is fully aware of the actions taken by defend-
ants with respect to its stock and their effect on the stock price.3"
If the defendant coerces but does not deceive the plaintiff, it does
not matter whether he has created an artificial market for the secur-
ity-it is not manipulation, although there may be a state cause of
action based on unfair conduct or breach of fiduciary duty.30 ' This is
297. In 1983, the SEC's Tender Offer Advisory Committee proposed that Congress should
take legislative action against greenmail. As a result, the Commission proposed legislation in
1984 that would restrict corporate repurchases from shareholders above the market price. The
Commission, however, later withdrew its support for this and other antigreenmail bills that
had been introduced in Congress, and no such legislation has thus far been enacted. S. 2782,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); S. 2777, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. (1984); H.R. 5693, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1984); Sec. Ex. Act Rel. No. 34-21079 (June 21, 1984). See also Impact of Greenmail,
supra note 291 (supporting Commission's position for requiring vote on these transactions in
light of the overall impact of greenmail on the wealth on nonparticipating shareholders);
Lipton & Brownstein, Takeover Responses and Directors' Responsibilities-An Update, 40 Bus.
LAW. 1403, 1413-14 (1985) (stating that the credibility of the greenmail threat is directly
related to the increasing availability of junk bond takeover financing and the ability to launch
two-tier offers).
298. FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,301, at 91,895 (D. Mass. Sept. 21, 1981), later op., FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,361 (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 1981), later proc., 542 F. Supp. 237 (D.
Mass. 1982).
299. Id. at 91,896.
300. Id. (citation omitted). See also Polinsky v. MCA Inc., 680 F.2d 1286 (9th Cir. 1982).
301. This, of course, is one of the lessons of Schreiber and Santa Fe. See supra note 77.
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true no matter how unfair the defendant's activities may be, and
regardless of whether these activities affect the price of the security.
Perhaps the most extreme example of an intentional impact on
the market that is not considered to be manipulation in the absence of
deception, is the alleged "destruction" of the market by a controlling
shareholder in order to acquire the minority's shares at a reduced
price. In Shivers v. Amero,3 °2 the individual defendants were mem-
bers of a family that owned ninety-four percent of Amerco stock.
The remaining shares were freely traded among the minority share-
holders, most of whom were employees of the company, at a normal
trading range of 120% to 130% of book value. Amerco had an infor-
mal policy of repurchasing minority shareholders' stock at book value
whenever a shareholder requested it to do so.
Minority shareholders brought an action alleging that the
defendants had decided to destroy the market for Amerco stock so
that they could buy up the minority shareholdings at a low price. In
order to accomplish this, the defendants allegedly used their control
to effect a 100 - 1 reverse stock split and also caused the company to
announce that it would no longer repurchase shares for book value
but would pay only fifty percent of book value. The plaintiffs claimed
that these actions " 'prevented free and honest balancing of invest-
ment supply with investment demand' and therefore constituted
manipulation of stock prices."3 °3 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
found for the defendants, saying that it doubted that the complaint
stated a cause of action under Rule 10b-5, because the nature of the
reverse stock split and the surrounding facts were fully disclosed, and
"[p]laintiffs have not alleged that defendants misled investors by artifi-
cially depressing the price of Amerco stock. 3 4
3. THE NATURE OF THE REQUIRED DECEPTION
It is clear that the deception required for manipulative conduct
need not be verbal. Falsification of the market may be accomplished
by acts, such as fictitious or even real trading, instead of by words.30 5
Furthermore, non-verbal deception can even be used to falsify the
302. 670 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1982).
303. Id. at 829 (citing United States v. Charnay, 537 F.2d 341, 349 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1000 (1976), aff'd on remand afterprior appeal, 577 F.2d 81 (9th Cir.' 1978)).
304. Id. (citing Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1977)). The court did not
actually reach the merits of the case, but affirmed the district court's dismissal of the suit on
the ground that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue. Id. at 829-31. Another decision holding
that "destruction" of the market is not manipulation is Nash v. Farmers New World Life Ins.
Co., 570 F.2d 558 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 822 (1978).
305. See supra text accompanying notes 133-45.
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public's valuation of a security.3 °6
What is more questionable is what must be the subject of the
deception. There is authority for the proposition that deception as to
the actor's motives3"7 or as to the likely effects of his actions308 is not
sufficient to establish a section 10(b) violation. Nevertheless, the deci-
sions raise considerable doubt as to whether this is in fact the case.
In Alabama Farm Bureau Mutual Casualty Co. v. American
Fidelity Life Insurance Co.,30 9 a shareholder brought a derivative suit
against a company that had repurchased about twenty percent of its
outstanding shares in the open market, claiming inter alia that the
purchases were part of a scheme by members of management to per-
petuate their control of the company" 'by manipulating the market in
[the company's] Shares and artificially inflating the market price of
306. O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964). In one forward-looking early
decision, the New York Court of Appeals held that a misrepresentation concerning the
financial situation of a company that was calculated to induce purchases of its securities was an
actionable fraud, even though the misrepresentation was effected by acts rather than by words.
The defendant was a corporate director who had agreed to declare a dividend out of the
company's capital, in violation of the New Jersey's dividend statute (2 N.J. Comp. St.,
Corporations §30 (West 1911)). The director then caused the dividend declaration to receive
widespread publicity. The plaintiff, who was not a shareholder at the time the dividend was
declared, purchased shares in reliance on the implied representation that the company had
sufficient surplus to legally declare the dividend. The court held in favor of the plaintiff,
adopting the opinion of the dissenting judge in the Appellate Division, which stated that a
fraudulent representation may be effected by conduct, and that "the representation need not
be made directly to the party injured by it." Ottinger v. Bennett, 144 A.D. 525, 533, 203 N.Y.
554 (1911).
307. In the wake of Santa Fe, courts have consistently held that since a shareholder
cannot recover under lOb-5 for a breach of fiduciary duty, neither can he
"bootstrap" such a claim into a federal securities action by alleging that the
disclosure philosophy of the statute obligates defendants to reveal either the
culpability of their activities, or their impure motives for entering the allegedly
improper transaction.
Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 288 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092
(1981) (citations omitted). See also R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION
1028 (5th ed. 1982). (Courts have found the true motives of the management "in engaging in
the transaction not in the context of total nondisclosure, but in connection with a proxy state-
ment which revealed all of the facts relating to the proposed transactions" not to be material.)
(footnote omitted).
308. Any tender offer or acquisition by a company of its own stock obviously would
reduce the number of outstanding shares and increase the proportionate control
and earnings of all shareholders who retained their stock.... It is not a violation
of any securities law to fail to disclose a result that is obvious even to a person
with only an elementary understanding of the stock market. . . . Nor is it
necessarily a violation of the securities law to have a plan to make a stock
acquisition with such a result, unless the plan includes practices that are intended
to mislead or to defraud investors.
Vaughn v. Teledyne, Inc., 628 F.2d 1214, 1220 (9th Cir. 1980) (citations omitted).
309. 606 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1979), reh'g denied, 610 F.2d 818 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 820 (1980).
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the Shares ... in order to discourage other shareholders or nonshare-
holders from purchasing Shares or attempting to gain control of' [the
company]." 31 0
Although the company adequately disclosed the size and scope of
the repurchase plan, a divided Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals never-
theless upheld the complaint against a motion to dismiss. The court
conceded that Rule lOb-5 does not require the defendants to disclose
either their motives or "to characterize the various effects of the trans-
action as favorable or unfavorable or to evaluate its overall effect." 3 1
Furthermore, it is not necessary to disclose the obvious: that stock
purchases will tend to increase the stock's price or avert a price
decline. Nevertheless, "it is necessary for the impact of a transaction
to be described factually to the extent that such information would be
significant to a reasonable, disinterested director . . . or share-
holder." '312 Here, the defendant omitted to disclose the "inflationary
effect" that the purchases would have on the market price of the com-
pany's outstanding shares. "[R]ead as a whole, the complaint . . .
asserts a scheme artificially to manipulate the market and artificially
(that is beyond the operation of normal market factors) to inflate
prices. 313
All of this is far from clear. If the directors of a company that
announces a repurchase plan are not required to state the obvious
(that the purchases are likely to raise the price of the stock), why are
they required to disclose the expected "inflationary effect" of the
repurchases? Furthermore, if directors are not required to disclose
their motives, why are they required to disclose that the repurchases
are part of a scheme artificially to manipulate the market?3" 4 While
the Alabama Farm opinion is consistent with the prevailing view, now
confirmed by Schreiber, that misrepresentation or nondisclosure is
required for manipulation, it seems to water down that requirement to
such an extent that it becomes almost meaningless.3" 5
310. Id. at 611.
311. Id. (citing Golub v. PPD Corp., 576 F.2d 759, 765 (8th Cir. 1978)).
312. Id. (citations omitted).
313. Id.
314. There is also an obvious circularity to the reasoning that the failure to disclose a
scheme to manipulate provides the deception necessary to make out a manipulative scheme.
Under this logic, if the defendant had disclosed a scheme to manipulate, there would be no
manipulation, because there would be no nondisclosure, and therefore no deception. The
paradox is reminiscent of the puzzle about a man who is about to be executed. He is told that
he may make one statement, and that he will be shot if it is a true statement and hanged if it is
a false one. The question is: what statement should he make to prevent his execution
altogether? The answer is: "I am going to be hanged."
315. See supra notes 49-50.
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The most persuasive basis for the view that nondisclosure of
motive furnishes the necessary deception in a manipulation case, how-
ever, is provided by a series of decisions involving the reduction or
elimination of dividend payments for allegedly manipulative pur-
poses. In these cases, a controlling person caused, or threatened to
cause, the company's directors to reduce dividends for the alleged
purpose of acquiring shares from non-controlling shareholders at a
reduced price.
In Cochran v. Channing Corp.,31 6 a relatively early Rule lOb-5
case, the complaint alleged that Channing, which controlled the
board of directors of Agricultural Insurance Company, had facilitated
its secret program for buying up the company's shares by reducing its
quarterly dividend, and
that because of the dividend reduction and lack of information as
to Channing's program of purchases, plaintiff ... sold some 500
shares . . . which he would not otherwise have sold, at a price
reflecting the depressing effect of the dividend reduction, and a
price below what he... could have obtained later after disclosure
of Channing's purchasing program ... 317
In holding that the complaint stated a cause of action under section
10(b) and subsections (1) and (3) of Rule l0b-5,31 8 the court stated:
One who causes a reduction of dividend in order more cheaply to
purchase the shares of a corporation is most certainly employing a
device to defraud and is engaging in a course of business which
operates as a fraud upon the seller of those securities .... In the
instant case defendants not only failed to disclose a material fact
(the true reason for the cut in the dividend rate) but were them-
selves responsible for its very existence.3"9
A few years later, in Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc.,32° the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals followed Cochran, upholding the
Rule lOb-5 complaint filed by shareholders of S.H. Kress and Com-
pany, which alleged that Genesco had "manipulated the market price
of Kress stock, in part by keeping the Kress dividends to a minimum,
in order to acquire shares of Kress's minority stockholders at less
than the true value," and which requested injunctive relief.3 2' The
court did not dispense with the need for deception, but stated that
316. 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
317. Id. at 242.
318. See supra note 20 for the texts of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.
319. Cochran, 211 F. Supp. at 243.
320. 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
321. Id. at 542. The Second Circuit stated that the fact that the plaintiffs themselves had
not sold their shares did not foreclose injunctive relief, because "[t]he complaint alleges a
manipulative scheme which is still continuing." Id. at 546.
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"[tihe alleged deceit was defendants' silence as to their true fraudulent
intentions and the actual value of Kress's real estate.
322
Cochran and Mutual Shares were decided before Santa Fe and, of
course, long before Schreiber. While they are consistent with these
two Supreme Court decisions insofar as requiring deception as an ele-
ment of manipulation, it is less than clear that the type of deception
involved in the dividend-reduction cases would meet the more strin-
gent requirements that the Court has since imposed. In Santa Fe, for
example, the Court defined manipulation as "practices .. .that are
intended to mislead investors by artificially affecting market activ-
ity." '23 Traditionally, the deception involved in a manipulative
scheme related either to the company or to the market itself.324 In
Cochran and Mutual Shares, however, the deception related princi-
pally to the defendant's motives for buying the stock.3 25 It is therefore
possible that the validity of these decisions has not survived Santa
Fe's and Schreiber's narrow interpretation of the statute.
Where, however, the threat of a dividend reduction is used to
coerce shareholders into selling their shares, there is no cause of action
for manipulation. This is consistent with the greenmail cases,
326
where coercion unaccompanied by misrepresentation or nondisclo-
sure has been held not to violate the antimanipulative provisions of
the Act. In Marsh v. Armada Corp.,3 27 a tender offeror announced to
shareholders of the target company that, in the event the takeover was
successful, dividends would cease. After the tender offer was success-
fully completed, dividends were eliminated. The Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals posed the issue in this way: "[W]hether manipulation of
the market price of the stock by eliminating dividends, with prior full
disclosure, violates § 10(b) of the Exchange Act, ' 328 and concluded in
the negative. The court distinguished Cochran and Mutual Shares on
the grounds that in these two cases "nondisclosure of the intent to
systematically lower dividends caused the manipulation to be decep-
tive and prevented the shareholders from being able to protect their
investment. Here we cannot find any action that deceived or
defrauded the shareholders. '3 29
322. Id. at 544.
323. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977) (citations omitted).
324. See supra text accompanying notes 115-45.
325. See supra text accompanying notes 316-22.
326. See supra text accompanying notes 291-97.
327. 533 F.2d 978 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954 (1977).
328. Id. at 982.
329. Id. at 984. It should be observed that in Marsh the court took the position that the
defendants' activities were manipulative but that they did not violate section 10(b) because




It seems clear that under the common law a specific intent to
affect the market is necessary for manipulation. The requisite intent is
different, however, depending on whether the manipulation is effected
by the use of materially false or misleading statements or omissions in
order to manipulate a stock, or by trading. The latter type of activity
raises difficult questions as to the nature of the intent that is required,
particularly in the context of corporate control transactions, where
the defendant's ultimate goal is likely to be to gain or keep control
over the company, rather than to profit directly from a change in the
price of its shares. The discussion of manipulative intent in this Arti-
cle is therefore divided between manipulation by non-trading activi-
ties and manipulation by trading.
1. MANIPULATION BY OTHER MEANS THAN TRADING
The weight of authority holds that making false or misleading
statements for the purpose of influencing the public's valuation of a
security constitutes manipulation under Section 10(b). In Atchley v.
Qonaar Corp. ,330 a shareholder of Qonaar claimed that controlling
persons of that company and of Kroehler Mfg. Co. had deliberately
depressed Qonaar's reported earnings in order to artificially reduce
the price of the stock, and thus enable a subsidiary of Kroehler to
make a tender offer for Qonaar's shares at a price below their real
value. According to the complaint, several means were employed to
accomplish this objective, including actually reducing the volume of
the company's business and making false accounting entries. 331 The
plaintiffs also charged that material facts were omitted from the
tender offer materials. The suit was brought under both sections
10(b) and 14(e).
The district court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the
alleged actions to reduce the company's earnings involved at most a
breach of fiduciary duty by Qonaar's officers and directors. Under
Santa Fe, a breach of fiduciary duty does not state a cause of action
manipulative devices prohibited in SEC Regulations are unlawful under the Exchange Act."
Id. at 982. The court apparently believed that an SEC rule under section 10(b) could proscribe
nondeceptive but manipulative conduct. Even if Santa Fe allowed any room for this view, it
no longer appears tenable after Schreiber. See supra text accompanying notes 49-50. See also
Hundahl v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1349, 1361 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (Judge
Higginbotham holding that improper restriction of dividends was not manipulative under
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5). For a discussion of Judge Higginbotham's views on
manipulation, see supra text accompanying notes 231-41.
330. 704 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1983).
331. Id. at 360-61.
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under the federal securities laws.a32 The Seventh Circuit reversed.
The court conceded that a party cannot "bootstrap" a state claim for.
breach of fiduciary duty into a federal securities claim by alleging that
the defendants failed to reveal the culpability of their improper
motives.333 But where there are more "substantial" allegations, a
cause of action under sections 10(b) and 14(e) may be stated, even
though "some of the plaintiffs' allegations may fall within the confines
of Santa Fe."'334 Here, "[p]laintiffs alleged a series of underlying facts
which were not disclosed which would have affected the valuation of
the stock.
33 5
Other courts have expressly held that false or misleading disclo-
sures made for the purpose of affecting the price of a security consti-
tute manipulative conduct under section 10(b). For example, in
Pellman v. Cinerama, Inc.,3 36 the district court refused to dismiss a
complaint alleging that controlling persons of Cinerama "manipu-
lated the market price of Cinerama stock and obtained shareholder
approval of [a "going private"] merger by means of a materially false
and misleading proxy statement. ' 337 As in Atchley, the court held
that a section 10(b) claim involving concealment of the company's
true value from the public was not automatically subject to dismissal
under Santa Fe simply because it also involved a breach of fiduciary
duty.338 Similarly, in Gilbert v. Bagley,339 a claim that controlling per-
sons of a company manipulated the market for the company's stock
through false and misleading financial reports was held to state a
claim under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.3" In that case, the corpo-
ration had agreed in the settlement of a previous action to purchase
shares of qualified shareholders at a price of $19 per share. The plain-
tiffs now claimed that controlling persons had manipulated the mar-
ket in order to keep the price artificially high and thus discourage
shareholders from selling their shares at $19.341 In both Pellman and
Gilbert, as well as in Atchley, the claim was that the misrepresenta-
332. Atchley v. Qonaar, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,725 at 93,642-43 (N.D. Ill. Mar.
29, 1982). See supra note 77.
333. 704 F.2d at 358 (citing Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 288 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981)).
334. Id.
335. Id. (citation omitted).
336. 503 F. Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
337. Id. at 108.
338. Id. at 109. See supra note 77.
339. 492 F. Supp. 714 (M.D.N.C. 1980).
340. Id. at 727.
341. Id. at 722.
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tions were made specifically to affect the price of the stock.34 2
2. MANIPULATION BY TRADING
Where a person is accused of manipulating a stock through trad-
ing, his activities-the purchase and sale of securities in the open mar-
ket-are in themselves consistent with the perfectly innocuous (if not
praiseworthy, in our capitalist system) purpose of making a profit.343
This is in contrast with other manipulative techniques, such as false
statements, bribery, or fictitious transactions, which, being deceptive
or at least wrongful in themselves, require a less specific intent to
make them manipulative. The question that has to be raised here is
342. In Jordan v. Global Natural Resources, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 59 (S.D. Ohio 1983), later
proc., 102 F.R.D. 45 (S.D. Ohio), later proc., 104 F.R.D. 447 (S.D. Ohio 1984), the district
court refused to dismiss a claim that misleading statements made by Global in the course of a
proxy fight were "manipulative" under section 10(b), even though the defendant's alleged
intent was "to further the control of the incumbent directors, rather than to manipulate the
price of shares on the market." Id. at 65. The court held that it is enough to show that the
defendant "intentionally disseminated false and misleading statements and omitted
information necessary to make the information not misleading.., with a reckless disregard for
the effect of its actions on the market." Id. The court relied on the Supreme Court's opinion
in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, which left open the question of whether recklessness would
satisfy the requirement that the defendant in a section 10(b) action act with scienter, and on
subsequent decisions of the lower federal courts holding that recklessness does satisfy the
scienter requirement. Id. at 65-66. Because Jordan dispenses with any requirement of specific
intent for manipulative conduct under section 10(b), it seems out of line with other decisions.
For the Supreme Court's discussion of the term scienter, see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976).
343. The following discussion of the requisite intent for manipulation by trading, written
shortly after enactment of the Exchange Act, can hardly be improved upon:
[P]urchase of a large amount of stock by an individual desiring it for purposes of
either investment or speculation may raise the price in the same manner that it is
forced up by a pool seeking public participation. The acts in each case are
objectively the same; the sole distinguishing feature is the purpose for which they
are undertaken, and this is the Act's criterion of illegality .... It is apparent ...
that [manipulative purpose] is less inclusive than the specific intent of the
criminal law which is strictly defined as the knowledge which a reasonable man
has, or should have in the light of surrounding circumstances, that certain
consequences will follow as a result of his acts. The large speculator, buying
heavily, might be said to intend that others enter the market and buy also, since
he can be reasonably certain that this will be the result. Yet the Act was
obviously not intended to curb such activity. Furthermore, the fact that this
consequence is agreeable to the trader is not the decisive element, since,
although he may know that others will enter the market and raise the price,
thereby increasing the paper value of his holdings, he does not necessarily carry
on the transaction for that end; this result may be incidental to his underlying
aim of securing a profit from anticipated price changes caused by the "natural"
forces which make prices. In the instance of manipulation, the principal object,
the immediate end to which the activity is directed is inducing others to trade. It
is this subjective difference in the primary objective that constitutes the line, often
a tenuous one, dividing the legal from the illegal.
Comment, supra note 23, at 633-34 (footnotes omitted).
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what specific intent is required to state a cause of action for manipula-
tion in a corporate control transaction in which the ultimate purpose
of the defendant's trading is to achieve, retain or consolidate control.
One possible approach to determining whether such trading
activity is manipulative is to look at its effect on the market mecha-
nism. Economists tell us that a market economy (in securities as well
as other goods and services) is one in which decision-making is
broadly based and each participant becomes an active part of a mas-
sive market-making apparatus. Buyers express the prices at which
they are willing to buy and sellers express the prices at which they are
are willing to sell. Their combined activities yield the prices at which
the particular security is exchanged. 3" In a perfect market, the
purchases and sales of a large number of participants collectively from
the "unseen hand" of the market establish a price. No single partici-
pant can by itself influence that price.3 41
Modern American securities markets may, in the case of the
most actively traded stocks, approximate a perfect market; but in gen-
eral that is not an accurate description of the markets. Many securi-
ties are not traded actively.3 46 Furthermore, the markets for active
issues are often dominated by institutional investors, which tend to
engage in very large purchases and sales.347 A purchase or sale, or a
series of purchases or sales, by a single investor may affect the market
for a stock. Furthermore, this effect may be quite predictable, both to
the participant itself as well as to anyone else who knows that a large
trade is about to occur.3 8  Under these circumstances, to define
''manipulative" as any transaction or series of transactions that
344. P. BARKLEY, INTRODUCTION TO MICROECONOMICS 53-57 (1977).
345. E. MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMIcs 20 n.2 (3d ed. 1979).
346. In 1984, 62% of the trading volume on the New York Stock Exchange (in terms of
number of shares traded) was in the 250 most actively traded securities, while the remaining
38% of volume was spread out over 2,069 securities. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, FACT
BOOK 1985 10, 37 (30th ed. 1985).
347. In 1984, 49.8% of share volume on the New York Stock Exchange was in transactions
of 10,000 or more shares, while only 11.3% of share volume was in transactions of 100-900
shares. Id. at 8. In the fourth quarter of 1980 (the most recent period for which such figures
are available), 64.9% of public (i.e., nonmember) share volume on the New York Stock
Exchange was accounted for by institutional investors. Id. at 56.
348. A type of insider trading known as "front-running of blocks" occurs when a securities
firm trades options with the advance knowledge that a "buy" or "sell" recommendation on
that stock will be made by an industry analyst. See Poser, Spotlight on Front-Running,
INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIGEST 15 (May 15, 1985). Although this practice does not clearly
violate SEC rules and none of the exchanges has a specific rule against it, front-running has
been a concern since options trading began in 1973. See Paine Weber Fined by Big Board,
CBOEfor 'Front-Running, Wall St. J., June 12, 1985, at 12, col. 2; Safire, Soft on Brokers,
N.Y. Times, July 8, 1984, at A17, col. 6; Weiner, Options Probe Seen Tied to Possible Use of
'Front Running', Wall St. J., Apr. 26, 1984, at 4, col. 1. If securities markets were perfect
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detracts from the "perfection" of the market would mean that all or
most large-scale investments would be forbidden. It would penalize
market participants purely because of their size, or at least it would
oblige large-scale participants to spread their investments over a
larger number of different securities than prudent management might
dictate. 34
Given the impracticality-and perhaps unfairness-of such a
broad definition of manipulation by trading activity, the federal secur-
ities law has narrowed the definition by requiring specific intent. We
have already seen that section 9(a)(2) of the Exchange Act requires
that the defendant must have the intent to induce others to purchase
or sell the security, 350 but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held
that this specific intent is not a requirement for manipulation under
section 10(b).351
What kind of intent (or purpose) then, is required? Perhaps not
too much light can be shed on this question, which Professor Loss has
suggested is better left to the metaphysicians.352 A few thoughts may
be put forward, however, in the context of corporate control
transactions.
In a contested takeover, the underlying purpose of the tender
offeror is usually to gain control of the company, while that of the
target's management (and perhaps of its allies) is to maintain its con-
trol. Similarly, in a negotiated merger, the goal of both sides is to
obtain terms that are as favorable as possible. The fact that neither
side is interested in affecting stock prices as an end in itself does not
prevent any of their trading activities that are designed to achieve
these ultimate goals from being manipulative. For example, in
markets, however, this offense could not occur because no single transaction could affect the
market.
349. The "defensive" investor's portfolio should contain no more than thirty common stock
issues. B. GRAHAM, supra note 140, at 54.
350. See supra text accompanying notes 191-205; see also Trane Co. v. O'Connor Sec., 561
F. Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 718 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1983) (where purchases of 1.5
million shares of a company's stock by an arbitrageur over a nine-month period, in the
expectation that the buyer would profit in the event that the company were to be a takeover
target, was held not to violate section 9(a)(2), despite the fact that the purchases may have
increased the price of the stock). The court said:
O'Connor's purpose was not to create an artificial demand for Trane stock nor to
induce public investment to its detriment. Defendants simply engaged in these
Trane transactions in the expectation of a profit. . . . If what defendants did
constituted manipulation within the meaning of Section 9(a), most large scale
transactions in a single security would be prohibited.
Id. at 305.
351. United States v. Charnay, 537 F.2d 341 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976),
aff'd, 577 F.2d 81 (9th Cir. 1978).
352. L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 993 (1983).
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Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp.,"' the complaint alleged that a
company in merger negotiations caused its subsidiary to buy the par-
ent company's stock in order to increase its price and thereby obtain a
more favorable exchange ratio in the merger. The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals held that a cause of action for manipulation under
section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 was stated.354
In Crane v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co.,355 which involved a con-
tested tender offer, a "white knight" (a company friendly to the target
company) made heavy open-market purchases of the target com-
pany's stock and secret sales of the stock off the market on the last
day of the tender offer, in order to make the market price of the stock
equal or exceed the tender-offer price and thus to discourage share-
holders from tendering their shares. The Second Circuit held that
these activities were manipulative under section 9(a)(2).356 They
would presumably also violate section 10(b).
Similarly, in Charnay,357 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that charges that persons who had made an offer to purchase a
company's assets had induced others to sell its shares in the market by
guaranteeing a minimum amount, for the purpose of depressing the
price of the stock and thereby in inducing the company's directors to
accept the asset-purchase offer, constituted an indictable offense for
market manipulation under section 10(b). 358
In each of these three cases, the end purpose of the manipulator
was to accomplish a purpose relating to corporate control, and the
trading was effected for the purpose of accomplishing this end. Nev-
ertheless, the intent to interfere with the free interplay of supply and
demand in the market made the activities manipulative. It should
also be noted that all three situations involved deception. In Schlick,
where the negotiations for an exchange ratio in a proposed merger
were based upon the market prices of the two companies' securities,
there would necessarily be an understanding between the parties that
these market prices were set by the free interplay of supply and
demand, without interference by either of the parties. Any trading by
the parties would be contrary to that understanding and therefore
deceptive. In Crane, the secret sales off the market were deceptive,
because the tender offeror had a right to expect that all sales would be
reflected in the market price of the stock. Similarly, in Charnay, the
353. 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975).
354. Id. at 378-79.
355. 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970).
356. Id. at 798.
357. See also supra text accompanying notes 226-30.
358. Charnay, 537 F.2d at 350.
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secretly guaranteed recovery to the sellers could be expected to
deceive investors into believing that the selling price of the shares on
the stock exchange represented the price that sellers were prepared to
receive for their shares.
In all three cases, the fact that deceit was an integral part of the
scheme is made clear by asking whether the scheme would have
worked if the other party had known of it at the time. In Schlick, the
answer is clearly in the negative, as knowledge of the scheme would
certainly have influenced the course of the negotiations. In Charnay,
it is unlikely that the American Stock Exchange, where the stock was
listed, would have permitted the sales to occur if it had known of the
secret guarantees to the sellers. In Crane, the answer is not quite so
clear. Even if the tender offeror had known that sales were being
made off the market, the effect of the purchases on the price of the
stock would have been the same, and shareholders might have been
deterred from tendering their shares. On the other hand, if sharehold-
ers of the target company had known that the market price was an
artificial one, which would likely not have been maintained once the
purchases by persons interested in defeating the tender offer ceased,
they might well have tendered their shares in the belief that the mar-
ket price would eventually decline as soon as the tender offer ended.
Thus, trading effected for the purpose of creating an artificial
market price for a security, although undertaken as a means of
achieving or maintaining corporate control is a manipulative practice.
On the other hand, market activity initiated for the purpose of achiev-
ing or maintaining control is not manipulative just because it happens
to influence the price of a security.3 59 In Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v.
Piper Aircraft Corp.,36° Chris-Craft had made an exchange offer, in
which it offered Piper shareholders a package of Chris-Craft securi-
ties, including common stock, in exchange for shares of Piper stock.
In this complex litigation, Bangor Punta Corporation, which had
made a competing tender offer, claimed that Chris-Craft had violated
sections 9, 10(b) and 14(e) by manipulating Piper's stock. Bangor
Punta's theory was that Chris-Craft had induced several institutional
investors to buy Chris-Craft stock, thereby inflating its price, with the
result that Chris-Craft's offer to Piper shareholders "would be decep-
359. This, of course, is the same point that was made earlier about Schreiber (a case that did
not, however, involve trading activity). Actions which have the incidental effect of influencing
the price of a security are usually not considered manipulative. See supra text accompanying
notes 86-93; Comment, supra note 23, at 636. But see supra note 352.
360. 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973), reh'g denied, 430 U.S. 976
(1976).
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tively attractive. 361  This in turn was said to have had the secondary
effect of driving up the price of Piper stock and of causing Bangor
Punta to pay more for Piper stock than it otherwise would have been
required to pay.362
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the evidence did
not support the allegations of manipulation.363 The court also said:
The securities laws do not proscribe all buying or selling which
tends to raise or lower the price of a security .... So long as the
investor's motive in buying or selling a security is not to create an
artificial demand for, or supply of, the security, illegal market
manipulation is not established. See Section 9(a)(2). 3 1
An inference may be drawn from the court's citing of section
9(a)(2) that the strict requirement of intent that is written into this
provision of the Exchange Act (that the trading be effected for the
purpose of inducing others to buy or sell the security) should serve as
a guideline, but not as an inflexible limit, for determining the intent
requirement of the general antimanipulative provisions, sections 10(b)
and 14(e).365
VI. CONCLUSION
Stock market manipulation is a serious crime that was well
known at least as long ago as the nineteenth century and still occurs
today.366 It is a serious offense because it injures or destroys the integ-
rity of the markets by falsifying the public's valuation of securities.
Manipulation thus may not only cheat investors by misleading them
into buying or selling securities at spurious prices; the damage done to
the markets may have much broader effects. These include affecting
the use of securities as collateral for loans, the determination of prices
at which a company is able to issue additional securities, and the valu-
361. Chris-Craft, 480 F.2d at 381.
362. Id. at 381.
363. "In the instant case, unlike Crane, the requisite purpose and wilfullness for a market
manipulation claim cannot be inferred from the established facts." Id. at 383.
364. Id. The danger that section 9(a)(2) is designed to protect against is the use of "the
high, artificially created market price [caused by the defendant's trading] to deceive people into
thinking the stock was of great value and thus persuade them to buy the stock at the inflated
price." Spencer Co. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,301, at
91,896 (D. Mass. Sept. 21, 1981), later op., FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,361 (D. Mass. Nov.
17, 1981), later proc., 542 F. Supp. 237 (D. Mass. 1982) (footnote omitted).
365. For discussion of section 9(a)(2), see supra text accompanying notes 190-207.
366. See, e.g.. In re Pagel, Inc., FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 83,909 (Aug. 1, 1985) (revoking
the registration of a broker-dealer firm for manipulating the price of a security in the over-the-
counter market by increasing the price in its published quotes, at a time when the public was
selling more shares than it was buying).
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ation of securities for taxation and other purposes. 367 Because of the
insidious and widespread effects of manipulation, its elimination was
one of the central purposes of the Exchange Act.36 8
In recent years, plaintiffs in cases involving tender offers and
other corporate control transactions have attempted to use the
antimanipulative provisions of the Exchange Act to attack allegedly
unfair or otherwise improper activities, including those that have
withstood state law challenges. In many instances, the challenged
actions were in no way deceptive but were fully disclosed. Further-
more, while the actions may have incidentally affected the price of
securities, this was not their purpose. To the limited extent that such
challenges were successful, the result was to stretch the concept of
manipulation beyond any reasonable definition of the term. The
Supreme Court's Schreiber decision has correctly curbed this ten-
dency by holding that misrepresentation or nondisclosure is a require-
ment for manipulation under section 14(e) and, by extension, section
10(b) of the Exchange Act. While the decision did not go further
than this, it is plain that manipulation also requires a specific intent to
influence the market price of the security and to do so in a deceptive
manner.
This is not to say that manipulation may not be present in corpo-
rate control transactions. In view of the importance of the market
price of the securities, there is an obvious temptation to manipulate in
many such instances. However, a pattern of activity is not manipula-
tion merely because an impact on the price of a security is one of its
incidental effects. It is manipulation only if deception is used as an
integral part of a scheme, one of whose primary objects is to influence
the market price of a security, and if such market influence is an
essential step in achieving the defendant's corporate control purpose.
Nevertheless, the fact that the ultimate purpose of the actions may be
something else, such as to gain or maintain corporate control, does
not prevent them from being manipulative.
367. See Poser, Restructuring the Stock Markets: A Critical Look at the SEC's National
Market System, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 883, 886 (1981).
368. See Exchange Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b.
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